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ABSTRACT 
 
PRIMITIVE DEFENSES AND UNILATERAL TERMINATION OF 
PSYCHOTHERAPY: ARE THE LERNER DEFENSE SCALES USEFUL IN 
PREDICTING PREMATURE TERMINATION IN PSYCHOTHERAPY? 
 
 
 
By 
Teal L. Fitzpatrick 
December, 2014 
 
Dissertation supervised by Roger Brooke, Ph.D., ABPP 
 This study explored whether a predictive relationship exists between primitive 
defense scores on the Lerner Defense Scales and premature termination from 
psychotherapy. A review of literature that described the history and development of the 
construct of primitive defense, as well as the purpose and formation of the Lerner 
Defense Scales was conducted in order to provide a context for the relevance of this 
study. Using achieved patient files from the Duquesne University Psychology Clinic, 
subjects were chosen for this project based on properly archived Rorschach Protocols 
(which are used to score the Lerner Defense Scales) and descriptive Final Summaries that 
described the conditions of termination. The Lerner Defense Scales were scored for the 
presence and frequency of primitive defense use, and subjects were determined to fall 
 v 
 
into either a Premature Termination Group or a Non-Premature Termination Group. 
Statistical analysis were run in order to determine 1) whether there was a predictive 
relationship between any Lerner Defense Scales and the termination group status and 2) 
whether there were statistically significant descriptive differences between these two 
groups. Results of these analyses showed that there was predictive value between 
combined scores measuring splitting, projective identification, and denial. Descriptively, 
the use of splitting was found to be significant between groups, with all individuals who 
used this defense terminating prematurely. These findings are discussed in more detail, 
and potential future directions for expanding this research are also addressed. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction and Conceptual Framework 
 “Ms. Smith1 attended the intake and assessment sessions but she did not 
show up for her first session. Upon the receipt of my call, she scheduled a 
session that she cancelled on the day of the meeting. I attempted to call 
her a couple of times and sent her a letter thereafter, but she did not 
return any further communications.” (From a final treatment summary, 
Duquesne University Psychology Clinic) 
 
 This project explores whether the presence of primitive defense mechanisms may 
correlate with early termination from psychotherapy. The experience of meeting with a 
new patient, only too quickly followed by missed appointments, unreturned phone calls, 
or departure from therapy just when it seems that progress begins, is a familiar scenario 
for most therapists.  Determining just what “premature termination” means, however, is a 
far more complex task. In a 2012 meta-analysis of studies related to premature 
termination, Swift and Greenberg aim to define the term:  
Premature discontinuation in therapy can be defined as occurring when a 
client starts an intervention but discontinues prior to recovering from the 
problem (symptoms, functional impairment, distress, etc.) that led him or 
her to seek treatment.  Implicit in this definition is the idea that the client 
has stopped the intervention without meeting the therapeutic goals or 
without gaining the full benefits that would have been available if the 
client had continued to attend and been fully invested in the sessions. (p. 
547).  
 Other factors used to determine premature termination in research studies include: 
therapist judgment, length of treatment, number of sessions attended, or assessment of 
                                                 
1 Pseudonym  
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patient functioning at the time of termination.  Swift and Greenberg attend to the ways in 
which these criteria have been used, and provide critiques of various methods. “Therapist 
judgment has historically been considered the preferable classification [for defining 
premature discontinuation of therapy], but this method depends on clinical judgment that 
can be biased and flawed” (Swift & Greenberg, 2012, 548).  Other studies have used 
length of treatment and conditions of dropout as the basis for determining premature 
termination:  
After pointing out the existence of many different operationalizations for the 
construct [premature termination], Garfield (1994) suggested that a dropout can 
be defined as a client who starts therapy (has at least one session) and then 
discontinues on his or her own without mutual agreement with the therapist. 
(Swift and Greenberg, 2012, p. 548) 
A common construct found in psychological literature is that of “therapeutic alliance”, or 
a strong relationship between the patient and therapist.   
In another recent meta-analysis that included 11 studies from the psychotherapy 
dropout literature, Sharif, Primavera and Diener (2010) found a significant 
relationship between the strength of the therapeutic alliance and premature 
discontinuation; weaker alliance was associated with an increased likelihood of 
dropping out. (Swift & Greenberg, 2012, 549)   
Because therapeutic alliance reflects a complex network of interpersonal relational 
factors this construct is more difficult to operationalize, and therefore this term has 
various definitions between studies. Even though operationalizing the term is 
inconsistent, “several studies have shown that, rather than categorical diagnosis, it is the 
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preexisting quality of the patient’s relationships that most significantly affects the quality 
of the therapeutic alliance” (Bender, 2005, p. 74). 
How common is premature termination? According to Swift and Greenberg’s 
meta-analysis, including 669 studies representing 83,834 clients, “…the average 
weighted dropout rate was 19.7%” (Swift and Greenberg, p. 555).  This suggests that 
fewer patients are dropping out of treatment now (one in five) than in 1993, when the last 
meta-analysis was conducted; that study showed that 47% of patients were leaving 
therapy prematurely (Wierzbicki & Pekarik, 1993).  Looking more closely at various 
groups identified within these studies, Swift and Greenberg determined that: 
Dropout rates were also higher for younger clients, those seen in a university 
based clinic, those with a personality or an eating disorder diagnosis, those who 
received a treatment that was not time-limited or manualized, and those who were 
seen by a provider in training. (Swift & Greenberg, 2012, p. 555) 
The authors also looked at dropout rates between various patient groups.  They cited one 
study looking at patients diagnosed with personality disorders, and found that dropout 
rates for this population were higher than the average national rate.  “Mcmurran, Huband 
and Overton (2010) recently conducted a systematic review of non-completion in 
personality disorder treatments.  Across 25 empirical studies, they found a median non-
completion rate of 37% (Swift & Greenberg, 2012, p. 549). The authors go on to 
comment: 
The fact that clients with personality disorder and eating disorder diagnoses had 
higher rates of dropout fits with McMurran et al.’s (2010) recent findings of a 
37% non-completion rate among personality disordered clients.  Given the rigid 
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nature of these disorders and the slow progress that is often observed in their 
treatment, it is perhaps not surprising that this result was found. (Swift & 
Greenberg, 2012, p. 556) 
Analyses looking at the various criteria used to determine dropout rate (therapist 
judgment, length of treatment, number of sessions, patient opinion) found that “dropout 
rates were highest when determined by therapist judgment (37.6%)” (Swift & Greenberg, 
2012, p. 555). 
As the mental health field adjusts to an ever-growing number of people seeking 
mental health treatment, patient dropout is of critical concern. “Clients who prematurely 
terminate have been found to exhibit poorer treatment outcomes and to be generally more 
dissatisfied with treatment” (Swift & Greenberg, 2012, p. 547). Furthermore, “therapy 
dropouts can also have a larger impact on agencies by limiting the number of people that 
can be served in an agency and by being more likely to start and stop treatment on 
multiple occasions as various site” (Swift & Greenberg, 2012, p. 547) and Ingenhovern, 
Duivenvoorden, & Passchier state: “In mental health clinics, length of stay and 
appropriate termination are highly related to successful treatment outcome, while 
premature termination, especially early dropout, is associated with low (cost)-
effectiveness” (2012, p. 172). 
 For individuals who are critically in need of treatment but for various reasons 
have difficulty utilizing therapeutic resources, multiple unsuccessful treatment attempts 
or chronic difficulties related to mental health create strain on providers and prolong 
suffering for the patient. 
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 Even though there have been hundreds of studies investigating premature 
termination, “little is known about predictors of treatment duration and premature 
termination of psychotherapy” (Ingenhovern et al., 2012, p. 172). Ingenhovern, et al. 
(2012) explored the relationship between “adaptive and maladaptive psychodynamic 
variables, as assessed by the Developmental Profile (DP)” and “premature termination in 
an inpatient psychotherapeutic treatment program for young adults with personality 
disorders” (p, 173). This study differs from most premature termination studies because it 
uses psychodynamic constructs as independent variables rather than a diagnostic category 
or demographic category. The authors defined premature termination as “the absence of 
regular discharge” (p. 175). The DP measures 10 psychodynamic variables, and the 
authors “computed aggregate variables” (p. 175) based on “primitive developmental 
level” variables (PRIM) and “neurotic developmental level” variables (NEURO). Their 
findings showed that “psychodynamic personality variables significantly predicted 
treatment duration and premature discharge. These findings support the relevance of 
psychodynamic assessments in clinical practice” (Ingenhovern et al., 2012, p. 172).  
 The issue of premature termination is complex and, despite the many studies that 
attempt to elucidate reasons patients leave treatment, researchers have yet to agree on 
why this phenomenon is so widespread. Early-career therapists and seasoned clinicians 
alike report the bewildering, frustrating, and deflating experience of feeling that a therapy 
was beginning well when a patient suddenly disappears from treatment and cannot be 
reached.  Patients have been described as “resistant”, “un-invested”, and “not ready for 
treatment”.  Some of these patients fit criteria for diagnostic categories, particularly 
personality disorders, which are often considered “difficult to treat” by nature. Other 
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clinicians, less focused on diagnostic differentiation, would consider “poor fit” in the 
therapist/patient relationship (Elkin et al., 2010), or would suggest that confounding 
factors including substance abuse, cognitive deficits, or trauma may problematize 
engagement with treatment (Walitzer, Dermen, Conners, 1999). Particular explanations 
notwithstanding, the desire to make sense of patient termination is part and parcel of the 
therapist’s experience.  
 There is no question that early termination has significant consequences for 
institutions, clinicians and especially, patients themselves. Better understanding the 
reasons that some individuals might leave treatment and considering ways to increase 
these patients investment in treatment are important areas of investigation. Swift and 
Greenberg remind us that: “…one in five clients still discontinue therapy prematurely. It 
is important to increase efforts to help these clients stay in therapy for the full duration” 
(2012, p. 557). This study examines factors that may help clinicians predict premature 
termination with the hope that these findings may make a practical difference in efforts to 
minimize unnecessary patient dropout. 
 This dissertation was originally conceived as an intersection of several areas of 
psychological interest: (a) the clinical problem of patient dropout; (b) an interest in the 
intersection of psychodynamic theory and quantitative research; (c) the value of 
projective testing; and (d) the value of assessment in case formulation and treatment 
planning.   
 This project assumes that use of psychological defenses may affect willing 
participation in psychotherapies of all sorts, and that understanding the relationship 
between defenses and the reaction to therapy itself may help clinicians better understand, 
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prepare for, and work collaboratively with the patients to maximize successful courses of 
treatment.  
 As a clinician in training, I have experienced firsthand patients leaving treatment 
unexpectedly or abruptly, often early in the therapeutic process. For some of these 
individuals there were clear indications that therapy was not appropriate, or there were 
obvious circumstances that led to early departure. With other patients, however, there 
was a clinical sense that something greater than external circumstance or poorness of fit 
was indicated in a decision to leave.  The act of leaving treatment seemed to be somehow 
relevant to the psychopathology or situation that brought these people to treatment in the 
first place.  I became intrigued by the idea that clinicians may have tools at their disposal 
to identify patients that may benefit from treatment but are made anxious or frightened by 
treatment processes early on. It seemed that part of the clinical puzzle might be 
identifying individuals for whom the act of staying in treatment itself may be the first 
step in recovery.  
 Following these ideas, I assumed that the act of leaving therapy did not 
necessarily mean that therapy was a poor treatment option for that person.  Rather, it 
suggested that flexible and creative treatment planning and therapeutic intervention are 
important in order to best set up the conditions of successful treatment adherence and 
therefore increase beneficial treatment outcomes for patients. This focus on clinician 
responsibility and expertise is rooted in the understanding that therapy can benefit many 
patients regardless of their psychological or diagnostic profile.  Nancy McWilliams 
writes that: “Experienced diagnosticians generally know by the end of the initial 
interview whether they are dealing with a person whose character presses for flight” 
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(2011, p. 16).  While this comment certainly testifies to the attunement of careful 
interviewing and the great knowledge attained through clinical experience, there are often 
elements of psychological organization that are not readily apparent.  Especially when 
considering unconscious processes, including defense structures, many clinicians 
discover that prominent or even foundational elements of psychological functioning are 
only evident later on in treatment or, in the case of early termination, may be inferred 
after a premature exit from treatment.   
This project assumes that individuals’ psychic functioning is heavily influenced 
by the use of defenses, or psychological behaviors that serve to avoid or manage “some 
powerful, threatening feeling” and “the maintenance of self-esteem” (McWilliams, 2011, 
p. 101). One way to explore the relationship between patient’s personality structure and 
how these structures may contribute to premature termination of treatment is to look 
more closely at the ways that defense mechanisms impact reactions to therapy itself. 
Because psychotherapy provides a venue that challenges and explores ways that 
individuals manage anxiety and other unpleasant emotions, one might expect that 
individuals who rely heavily on certain types of defense will feel frightened by and 
threatened by traditional psychotherapies; in short, the “treatment” excites and activates 
the patient’s compelling desire to flee the treatment environment. Melanie Klein 
describes this phenomenon beautifully: 
For the patient is bound to deal with conflicts and anxieties re-experienced toward 
the analyst by the same methods he used in the past. That is to say, he turns away 
from the analyst as he attempted to turn away from his primal objects; he tries to 
split the relation to him, keeping him either as a good or as a bad figure; he 
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deflects some of the feelings and attitudes experienced towards the analyst on to 
other people in his current life, and this is part of ‘acting out.’ (Klein, 1986, p. 
209) 
Understanding the behavior of a client who responds to anxiety with defenses like 
splitting or devaluation as a way to protect the self from the unpleasant feelings provoked 
in therapy can make the desire to leave treatment more intelligible. Furthermore, the 
ability to empathize with the patient’s attempt to manage seemingly unmanageable 
feelings may allow the therapist to understand the transference position he or she may 
inhabit for the skittish patient. “The patient may at times try to escape from the present 
into the past rather than realize that his emotions, anxieties and phantasies are at the time 
operative in full strength and focused on the analyst” (Klein, 1986, p. 240). In this way, 
the patient’s pathology or suffering is manifest in the treatment room, in the relationship 
between the patient and therapist. 
 Psychoanalytic and psychodynamic theory understands psychological functioning 
as rooted in early childhood experiences and continually evolving in relationship to a 
person’s environment, relationships, and understanding of self.  In this model, particular 
diagnoses can then be seen in a wide variety of personality structures and therefore will 
look different depending on the overall psychological organization of each individual.  
For example, depression in a psychotically organized person will look and function quite 
differently than depression in a neurotically organized individual. As Jonathan Shedler 
(2013) aptly states: “depression may be better understood as a nonspecific symptom—the 
psychic equivalent of fever—of a wide range of underlying difficulties, for example, 
in attachment, or interpersonal functioning, or in reconciling inner contradictions” (para. 
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5). With this understanding we see psychiatric diagnoses not as a discreet pathologies, 
but as particular constellations of symptoms that may originate from different 
foundational struggles.  Understanding symptoms as the expression of relationships 
between personality organization and external circumstances is at the heart of 
psychodynamic understanding of suffering.  
Since a depressed individual, in this view, may be exhibiting symptoms of 
depression for a variety of reasons, the clinician will want to know much more about each 
patient and his or her personality structure in order to best plan for treatment. This project 
assumes that one element of sensitive diagnosis is identifying defense patterns as well as 
manifest symptoms, and using this data to plan the best way to provide service for the 
“skittish patient” who may be responding or fleeing from treatment based on defensive 
style. George E. Vaillant unequivocally states: “No mental status or clinical formulation 
should be considered complete without an effort to identify the patient’s dominant 
defense mechanism” (1992, p. 3), and Michael Bond cautions that: “linking defenses with 
specific illnesses can create confusion. The term defense should refer to a style of dealing 
with conflict or stress, whereas the term diagnosis should refer to a constellation of 
symptoms or signs” (Bond, in Vaillant, 1992, p. 130).  
Ultimately, the goal of treatment is to support the patient in developing a stronger 
sense of psychological well-being and increase his or her satisfaction and self-awareness. 
This process occurs over time, and while some patients report improvement after only a 
few weeks and others remain in treatment for many years, it is an obvious fact of 
treatment that, for the work to begin, the patient must show up. McWilliams points to the 
clinician’s attunement and diagnostic skill as essential to establishing the necessary 
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rapport to begin a therapy relationship: “An issue related to conveying empathy involves 
keeping the skittish patient in treatment” (2011, p. 16).  
Of course, all premature termination cannot be ascribed to defensive reactions. 
There are countless reasons that individuals choose to leave treatment, which is one of 
the reasons that this phenomenon is so difficult to study. Factors external to the treatment, 
including relocation, financial circumstances, or the end of a school semester are all 
common reasons for ending therapy. A lack of concurrent therapy goals between 
therapist and patient, improvement in symptoms, a lack of improvement in symptoms, 
and therapist errors are all valid reasons for terminating treatment as well, and have 
nothing to do with the activation of defenses.  However, for those patients whose anxiety 
is triggered by the intimacy and intensity of therapy itself, early identification of 
defensive flight is exceptionally important.  
 Foundational to the development of this research question is the construct of 
defense.  “The term ‘defense,’” writes McWilliams (2011) “in psychoanalytic theory is in 
many ways unfortunate. What we end up calling defenses in mature adults begin as more 
global, inevitable, healthy, adaptive ways of experiencing the world” (p. 100). In other 
words, defense processes can be considered natural, healthy and adaptive. The 
psychological processes that create what we later call defenses are developed early on, 
and are considered important components of an individual’s psychological functioning.  
By looking at ways that patients’ employ defenses, and how defensive operations have 
served the patient in the past, we may have greater empathy in understanding the role 
played by these individuals’ personality structures in organizing interactions with the 
world.  Though diagnoses can communicate a great deal of information about symptoms, 
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functioning, and levels of psychological pathology, defenses tell us about the patient’s 
style of experiencing the world and relationships, allowing insight into individual styles 
of coping. As Bond observes: “defense styles might identify aspects of a person’s stage 
of development and render other information about ego functioning independent of 
diagnosis” (Bond, in Vaillant, 1992, p. 130). 
 One such use of identifying defense styles might be to establish whether the 
person employs defense mechanisms in a primarily adaptive or pathological manner. Are 
the defense patterns operating in the support of ego development and health, or are they 
hindering an individual’s functioning and quality of life? Are the prominent defense 
processes developmentally appropriate (e.g. does an adult rely primarily on more mature 
defense patterns) or do these processes support a more pathological presentation?   
 Well-trained clinicians are aware of and capable of responding to primitive 
defense manifestations during the course of therapy.  The ability to work with 
transference and countertransference, provide a safe holding environment, and avoid 
becoming overwhelmed by intense emotional material are all hallmarks of good therapy 
with highly defensive patients.  Many of these skills, however, are employed during the 
course of an ongoing therapy in which rapport has already developed, both the patient 
and therapist have developed an understanding of the therapeutic space, and there is 
investment by both parties in the process.  Grotstein writes:  
Abnormal splitting and projective identification [primitive defense] emerge from 
infantile mental catastrophe, disappointment, dissolution, and despair. Thus, the 
therapist who wishes to acknowledge the importance of splitting and projective 
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identification must allow himself to become “pregnant” with his patient’s 
material. (2005, p. 461)   
Here, Grotstein refers to the therapist’s attunement to the patient’s primitive material, and 
his or her ability to allow feelings to be felt subliminally and grow, until they are ready to 
be born into an interpretation within language. Sensitivity to the deeply emotional, often 
preverbal sources of these defenses is crucial. With the appropriate development of the 
therapeutic relationship, the therapist holds emotionally charged and labile events in the 
session room, and uses this material in the service of therapeutic progress.  This becomes 
more challenging, however, when these defenses rise without a foundation in place, for 
example as the therapy first begins. It can be difficult, technically and emotionally, to 
identify and manage strong defensive strategies (such as splitting) during the early stages 
of therapy, as early as intake session. For many patients, intake and early sessions are a 
critical period as they determine, consciously or unconsciously, whether to remain in 
treatment. It is a reasonable hypothesis that the very practice of beginning a therapy may 
raise anxiety, suggest power imbalances, and highlight the patient’s role as “in need.”  
These circumstances then set the conditions for primitive defenses to come into play 
quickly for the patient who relies heavily on these strategies. “We see from case 
histories,” Grotstein writes, “that these patients invariably had to resort to the use of 
defensive spitting and projective identification because of their feelings of enfeeblement 
and helplessness” (Grotstein, 2005, p. 461). 
 For these individuals, therapy may be a short-lived experience.  Once splitting or 
projective identification defenses are activated, the therapist or therapy may be 
understood as threatening or dangerous, and the patient may flee treatment. In this 
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hypothetical situation a defense pattern leads to a termination of therapy, which is the 
focus of this study. If a significant correlation between defense profiles and early 
terminations can be found, therapists may be able to identify these patients before the 
dropout occurs and work with that person to encourage continuation of treatment. 
Additionally, therapists may have more material to guide assessment and treatment 
planning practices, encouraging the best possible therapeutic outcomes for patients that 
may traditionally “fall through the cracks.”   
Research studies have looked at correlations between diagnostic groups and early 
termination, looking for categorical differences in treatment adherence between 
populations with shared diagnoses (Ingenhoven, Duivenvoorden, Passchier, & Van den 
Brink, 2012; McMurran, Huband, & Overton, 2010). However, there is a dearth of 
research that addresses the presence of primitive defense and the question of premature 
termination related to this presentation.  Theoretical literature is rich with clinical 
descriptions of primitively defended patients, and there is no shortage of material on links 
between defense, diagnoses, personality structure, and therapeutic work focusing on 
defense patterns (Bender, 2005; Samstag, Batchelder, Muran, Safran & Winston, 1998).  
In psychological research, there is ample work that focuses on early termination, the 
therapeutic alliance, diagnoses and therapeutic success, and appropriate therapy 
modalities for varying presenting problems.  However, the scarcity of research that 
addresses termination as a potential result of personality structure rather than personality 
profile (e.g. symptoms or demographics) is indicative of a common tendency to avoid 
dynamic constructs in research projects.  There are some valuable exceptions to this rule.  
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In a study using the Rorschach test, Horner and Diamond found that 
clients with a predominance of narcissistic themes were more likely to 
drop out of treatment, whereas clients who continued treatment showed a 
predominance of rapprochement themes. Hilsenroth and Handler found 
that Rorschach variable of interpersonal relatedness significantly 
predicted premature termination, with more dependent patients staying in 
psychotherapy longer. Finally, in a study by Perry et al., the number of 
sessions in long-term dynamic psychotherapy was directly predicted by a 
higher adaptive defensive style. (Ingenhoven, Duivenvoorden, Passchier, 
& Van Den Brink, 2012, p. 173). 
This project was designed as a contribution to this small but important body of research 
linking premature termination and defensive patterns. As Ingenhoven et al. (2012) 
asserts, there is still ample room for additional knowledge in this area. 
Clarkin and Glock stressed the importance of characterological aspects in 
the prediction of treatment duration and treatment outcome. Yet little is 
known about the role of psychodynamic personality characteristics in the 
prediction of length of stay or dropping out of psychotherapy. (p. 173) 
The present research project asks whether a statistically significant relationship may be 
found between demonstration of primitive defense use and unilateral termination of 
treatment.  It was conceived as an attempt to fill a gap in research regarding dropout rates 
in therapy, a need suggested by Swift & Greenberg in a 2012 meta-analysis of 
psychotherapy drop out trends:  
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Future reviews are needed to study dropout in the areas not covered by this 
review, including examining the influences of process variables on dropout, 
studying dropout in substance abuse treatments, reviewing dropout for children 
and/or family therapy, and so on. (Swift & Greenberg, 2012, p. 558) 
This research focuses on the ways that therapy-related dynamics, based on patient 
defense organization, may contribute to drop out rate, thus adding to the existing research 
on patient termination. Purposefully, defense was identified as the independent variable 
over diagnosis, as this construct is considered particularly relevant to anxiety 
management. While appropriate diagnosis can offer a good description of a patient’s 
presenting symptoms and difficult experiences, defenses demonstrate where and how a 
patient experiences anxiety, and anxiety is assumed to be one reason that patients flee the 
treatment situation. McWilliams notes that therapy elicits different responses for different 
patients depending on his or her history, and some of these responses may increase risk 
for flight from treatment: “Those with hypomanic personalities, for example, because 
early experiences of depending on others came out disastrously, tend to bold from 
relationships as soon as the therapist’s warmth stimulates their dependent longings” 
(2011, p. 16). Here, it is not at matter of the diagnosis in and of itself driving flight, but 
the anxiety provoked by the relationship with the therapist that leads to the unilateral 
termination. 
Separating the examination of defenses from the issue of diagnosis would allow 
the concept of defense to be used more precisely during investigations of 
fluctuations in a person’s style of dealing with a particular stress at a particular 
time and under particular circumstances. (Vaillant, 1992, p. 130) 
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In order to identify the presence of defense, the Lerner Defense Scales, scored from the 
Rorschach Inkblot Test, were chosen as the assessment method, and termination status 
(premature or not) was gleaned from discharge summaries in patient files. 
My hypothesis at the beginning of this study was that there would be an evident 
link between some primitive defenses and unilateral patient termination of treatment.  
The research aimed to answer two main questions: 1) did the presence of primitive 
defense in a profile predict premature termination, and 2) was there a significant 
difference found between groups (premature and not premature termination) and the 
presence or amount of primitive defenses used? 
  Fundamentally, this project is looking at measurable relationships. However, it 
tried to simultaneously maintain a focus on contextualizing these findings and 
considering potential findings’ clinical utility. Quantitative findings are valuable in 
demonstrating relationships between variables, but are not fully utilized until they have 
been applied to the human subjects they aim to describe. Always, this work was guided 
by a strong belief in the practical utility of research findings, so eloquently stated by 
Applebaum: “As a guide to action, the test report should answer the question, ‘What 
practical difference do test findings make?’ ‘So What?’” (1970, p. 354). 
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Chapter Two 
Defense Mechanisms 
This review summarizes major theoretical contributions concerning defense 
mechanisms and beliefs over time regarding hierarchies or developmental models of 
defense. Since Freud’s introduction of the term defense, defining defense mechanisms, 
much less “primitive” vs. “secondary” defenses has been an ongoing, often halting 
process. George Vaillant notes that:  
In terms of recognizing a continuum of defenses from pathological to less 
pathological, many early contributors to ego psychology… recognized the 
likelihood of such a hierarchy. But none provided specific hierarchical outlines or 
empirical evidence for such a hierarchy. (Vaillant, 1992, p. 90) 
Though a hierarchy of pathology may not be widely developed or accepted, 
differentiating defenses into categories that differentiate between lower order and higher 
order (primitive and secondary) groups is commonly assumed in contemporary 
psychoanalytic theory. 
Broadly speaking, primitive or primary defenses are seen as natural expressions of 
pre-verbal psychological development, and are only considered “problematic” when 
adults use these defenses in lieu or in the absence of more mature (secondary) defense 
operations. Psychodynamic theory considers defense use important to proper case 
formulation, and views defense constellations as part of a developmental trajectory.  
McWilliams (2011) describes the two major categories of defense profiles as 
follows:  
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In general, the defenses that are referred to as primary or immature or primitive or 
“lower order” (Laughlin, 1970) are those that involve the boundary between the 
self and the outer world” (p. 98) while “Those [defenses] that are conceived as 
secondary or more mature or advanced or ‘higher order’ deal with internal 
boundaries such as those between the ego or superego and the id, or between the 
observing and experiencing parts of the ego (p. 98). 
 Although primitive defenses are the first natural order of defenses, expected in 
children and, in moments, with adults, relying on primarily primitive defenses into 
adulthood is seen as a developmentally problematic way of managing internal conflict 
and interpersonal relationships.   
In the most primitive state, which may be retained in illness, and to which 
regression may occur, the object behaves according to magical laws, i.e., it 
exists when desired, it approaches when approached, it hurts when hurt. 
Lastly, it vanishes when not wanted. (Winnicott, 2005, p. 184) 
Here, Winnicott vividly describes the patient who has maintained or regressed to an 
emotional understanding that mirrors preverbal thinking. Though this individual may 
present with appropriate reality testing to the casual observer, his or her emotional state 
reflect deep anxiety related to the fear of annihilation that goes beyond language. For 
example, a man questioned about his fear of being left by his wife may not be able to 
articulate more than basic tropes about feeling nervous about being lonely, feeling like a 
failure, or other cognitively unremarkable responses. However, the emotional core of his 
fear, the feelings that arise and take over when he considers this possibility, may feel so 
overwhelming that he cannot tolerate the experience. He is experiencing this emotional 
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state much as he may have experienced the world as a much younger person. Similarly, 
the individual who feels compelled to count the number of cracks in a sidewalk for fear 
that her mother may fall ill, can express a cognitive understanding that this is not a 
logical behaviors, and that most people would not believe that there could be a 
correlation between this ritualized act and another person’s health. However, if she is so 
overtaken by anxiety if she cannot complete this task that she experiences panic attacks, 
Winnicott would surely argue that she, psychologically and emotionally speaking, 
responds to her situation from this place of magical thinking, driven by preverbal ways of 
experiencing the world.  
Primitive defenses (used interchangeably in the literature with “primary” 
defenses) must “show evidence of two qualities associated with the preverbal phase of 
development: a lack of attainment of the reality principle and a lack of appreciation of the 
separateness and constancy of those outside the self” (McWilliams, 2011, p. 102).  
Primitive defenses include: (a) primitive withdrawal, (b) denial, (c) omnipotent control, 
(d) primitive idealization (and devaluation), (e) projection, introjection, and projective 
identification, (f) splitting, and (g) dissociation. Based on the nature of psychotherapy as 
a venue in which both issues of reality and issues of self-knowledge are explored, one 
might expect that individuals who rely heavily on primitive defenses will feel frightened 
by and threatened by traditional psychotherapies; the “treatment” excites and activates 
the patient’s compelling desire to flee the treatment environment. A patient who relies 
heavily on splitting, for example, as a means of avoiding deep fears of abandonment and 
annihilation, might perceive the possibility of intimacy (and therefore potential rejection) 
in the therapeutic relationship as dangerous, and thus leave treatment. We will return to 
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this idea when discussing the assessment situation and the function of defense 
mechanisms. 
 This chapter presents a historical overview of psychoanalytic theories of defense, 
and provides a brief summary of ways that two contemporary practitioners (Vaillant and 
McWilliams) incorporate psychoanalytic theory on defense and practical guidance for 
clinical work. Because this study aimed not only to explore potential correlation between 
defense and termination, but to also suggest clinical implications of these findings 
(including suggestions for therapists in using this information in practice), both theory 
and application of this theory were integral to this literature review. 
A Theoretical History of Defense Mechanisms 
Sigmund Freud 
Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) introduced the term “defense mechanism” in 1894 in 
his paper “The Neuro-psychoses of Defence.” For Freud, defense mechanisms are the 
psychological response to anxiety. “Anxiety is a reaction to a situation of danger. It is 
obviated by the ego’s doing something to avoid that situation or to withdraw from it” 
(Freud, 1959, pp. 54-55). Freud believed that the human psyche is self protective in the 
same way that the human body seeks to avoid pain or suffering and that signs of danger, 
whether or not these dangers have a basis in reality, set a series of defensive processes in 
motion. “The defensive process is analogous to the flight by means of which the ego 
removes itself from a danger that threatens it from outside. The defense process is an 
attempt at flight from instinctual danger” (Freud, 1959, p. 71). 
Between the introduction of the defense mechanisms in 1894 and the publication 
of Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety in 1926, Freud continued to refer to defense and 
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repression rather interchangeably. It is commonly written that, during those years, Freud 
abandoned the terms defense and defense mechanisms completely, and subsumed these 
ideas under the larger construct of “repression.”  
Freud had first cleanly differentiated among various defense mechanisms and then 
confounded the issue by making one of his favorite psychoanalytic concepts, 
repression, stand both for the mental technique of denying certain ideas access to 
consciousness and for all other ways of parrying unpleasurable excitations. He 
was now ready to correct this imprecision by returning to ‘the old concept of 
‘defense’’ as a ‘general designation for all the techniques’ the ego employs in the 
conflicts that may lead to neurosis, ‘while ‘repression’ remains the name of one 
certain method of defense.’ (Gay, 1988, p. 488) 
However, Freud did continue to write about defenses, though much more sparingly, 
during this period although he did in fact prefer the term repression. It is unclear whether 
he meant to use defense as the action taken by the psyche, and repression as the function 
itself, which may explain his continued use of the word “defense.” In the addendum to 
Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, Freud clarified his thoughts on defenses vs. anxiety, 
stating:  
In the course of discussing the problem of anxiety I have revived a concept… of 
which I made exclusive use thirty years ago… but which I later abandoned. I refer 
to the term ‘defensive process.’ I afterward replaced it by the word ‘repression,’ 
but the relation between the two remained uncertain. It will be an undoubted 
advantage, I think to revert to the old concept of ‘defence,’ provided we employ it 
explicitly as a general designation for all the techniques which he ego makes use 
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of in conflicts which may lead to a neurosis, while we retain the word ‘repression’ 
for the special method of defence. (1959, p. 89) 
Perhaps one of the reasons that Freud saw a need to clarify multiple types of defensive 
functions was his growing understanding of the way that defense fit into a developmental 
trajectory.  
It may well be that before its sharp cleavage into an ego and an id, and before the 
formation of a super-ego, the mental apparatus makes use of different methods of 
defence from those which it employs after it has reached these stages of 
organization. (Freud, 1959, p. 90) 
Freud spent some time in Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety hypothesizing about the 
ways that children and adults are alike and different in their need for and use of particular 
modes of defense. He does not, however, go so far as to delineate developmental qualities 
of each defense, nor does he bring the term “primitive defense” into parlance.  
 For Freud, the use of defense, whether couched in terms of defense mechanisms, 
inhibitions, or repression, is one of the hallmarks of human psychological functioning, 
and has implications for neurosis and psychopathology. It was his daughter Anna Freud, 
however, who expanded the study of defense mechanisms into a particularly robust 
subfield within psychoanalysis. Her father had reintroduced the importance of 
acknowledging specific defense mechanisms (as opposed to linking all defenses under 
the umbrella of “repression”) when he was 70 years old. He was aware of Anna Freud’s 
careful attention to this area of investigation and, in essence, passed the torch when he 
stated: “there are an extraordinarily large number of methods (or mechanisms, as we say) 
used by our ego in the discharge of its defensive functions… my daughter, the child 
 24 
 
analyst, is writing a book upon them” (Freud, 1936, p. 245). Anna Freud’s most 
important work, The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense, was her 80th birthday gift to 
her father (Vaillant, 1992). 
Anna Freud  
In 1936, Anna Freud (1895-1982) published “The Ego and the Mechanisms of 
Defense,” the first publication dedicated solely to the exploration and understanding of 
defense mechanisms. In this book, Anna Freud reiterated and condensed much of 
Sigmund Freud’s work on the subject but expanded these concepts enormously, naming 
and describing multiple defensive processes that are still referred to in psychoanalytic 
theory today. Anna Freud embraced her father’s theory that defense mechanisms 
provided the ego with necessary relief from neurotic anxiety: 
The institution which sets up the defense and the invading force which is warded 
off are always the same; the variable factors are the motives which impel the ego 
to resort to defensive measures. Ultimately all such measures are designed to 
secure the ego and to save it from experiencing unpleasure. (1966, pp. 69-70) 
However, her work clearly inferred a developmental context, referring to the “infantile 
ego” as opposed to the ego of the latency period, adolescent period, or adult period.  
Sigmund Freud hinted at a differentiation between primitive and secondary defense 
mechanisms in Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, but did not draw a clear distinction 
between the two. Anna Freud also evades categorically describing defenses in this way, 
and clearly states that the project of determining hierarchical levels of defense is 
premature.  
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The chronology of psychic processes is still one of the most obscure fields of 
analytic theory… so a classification of the defense mechanisms according to 
position in time inevitably partakes of all the doubt and uncertainty which even 
today attach to chronological pronouncements in analysis. It will probably be best 
to abandon the attempt so to classify them and, instead to study in detail the 
situations which call for the defensive reactions. (Freud, 1966, p. 53) 
She goes on to predict, however, further developments in this classification process.  
As our knowledge of the unconscious activity of the ego advances, a much more 
precise classification will probably become possible. There is still considerable 
obscurity about the historical connection between typical experiences in 
individual development and the production of particular modes of defense. (1966, 
p. 173) 
Though she points out difficulties with the task of classifying types of defense, 
Anna Freud makes ample use of terms that assume developmental qualities associated 
with defense use, suggesting that lower-level defenses rely on phantasy and make-believe 
while higher-order defenses operate in the realm of reality. Anna Freud identifies fantasy 
itself as an early defense, common and “a normal phase in the development of the 
infantile ego” (1966, p.80) but notes that: “if it recurs in later life, it indicates an 
advanced stage of mental disease” (1966, p. 80). These observations foreshadow the later 
work of theorists such as Otto Kernberg, who identify developmentally inappropriate use 
of primitive defense mechanisms as the hallmark of borderline personality organization.  
 Making good on her purported goal of “study in detail the situations which call or 
the defensive reactions” (1966, p. 53), Anna Freud attends to the particular projects of the 
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ego at various stages of development, and how defense assists in maintaining ego 
functioning. For the infant, not yet fully differentiated from his or her environment, 
maintaining and developing the ego is a monumental task. “The infantile ego experiences 
the onslaught of instinctual and external stimuli at the same time; if it wishes to preserve 
its existence it must defend itself on both sides simultaneously” (Freud, 1966, p.174). 
This preservation of existence calls for all-or-nothing manifestations of psychological 
functioning, and defense mechanisms including repression, denial and what Melanie 
Klein later refers to as “splitting” allow the infant to contain and isolate unpleasant 
sensations. “For some years the infantile ego is free to get rid of unwelcome facts by 
denying them, while retaining its faculty of reality testing unimpaired” (1966, p. 83). 
Anna Freud is quick to point out that at these early stages of development these types of 
psychological behaviors are not aberrant and are, in fact, developmentally appropriate.  
The mechanism of avoidance is so primitive and natural and, moreover, so 
inseparably associated with the normal development of the ego that it is not easy, 
for purposes of theoretical discussion, to detach it from its usual context and view 
it in isolation. (1966, p. 94) 
In other words, the infant that manages anxiety by falling asleep is not circumventing a 
more appropriate way of handling this situation, but is using the available resources at his 
or her disposal to maintain functioning.  
 Anna Freud also begins to construct a framework that explains why particular 
defensive processes may be recycled throughout a lifetime. There are times of extreme 
stress, she suggests, that call on the ego to muster all available resources in the service of 
managing anxiety. “Any additional pressure of instinctual demands stiffens the resistance 
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of the ego to the instinct in question and intensifies the symptoms, inhibitions, etc., based 
upon that resistance” (1966, p. 151).2 Not all “redoubled defense activities” are 
regressive, and Anna Freud relies on metaphors of force and power to describe the 
changing demands placed on the ego by the id. Describing the “human ego’s great 
capacity for transformation,” set against the “immutability of the id” defense patterns in 
different stages of life become more intelligible.  
Let us take as an example the ego in early childhood and the ego at puberty. At 
the one period and at the other it differs in compass, in content, in its knowledge 
and capacities, in its subordinate relationships and anxieties. Consequently, in its 
conflicts with the instincts it makes use of different defense mechanisms in the 
different periods. We may expect that a more detailed examination of these 
differences between early infancy and puberty will throw light onto the formation 
of the ego… (1966, p. 141) 
Here, Anna Freud provides us with a lovely example of the flexibility of the psyche to 
respond to perceived threats in a variety of ways, and that the response to threat depends 
on the perceived danger of the threat. This idea will be especially relevant when we later 
discuss rigid and overcompensating ways of responding to anxiety.  
 Notwithstanding the appropriateness of the defense response, Anna Freud 
emphasized that the goal of defensive behavior is always the same. 
The ego is victorious when the defensive measures effect their purpose, i.e., when 
they enable it to restrict the development of anxiety and unpleasure and so to 
                                                 
2 Apparently, stigmatization of hormonal changes associated with menstruation (exemplified by the 
inclusion of Premenstrual dysphoric disorder in the DSM 5) has changed little over time; here, Anna Freud 
links premenstrual symptoms and pathology in the same breath: “We know from the study of neurotic 
symptoms and premenstrual states that, whenever the demands of instinct become more urgent, the ego is 
impelled to redouble its defensive activities” (1966, p. 150). 
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transform the instincts that, even in difficult circumstances, some measure of 
gratification is secured.” (1966, p. 176) 
Although she maintained her position that each defense mechanism is specifically 
employed to address a particular manifestation of anxiety or fear, Anna Freud 
consistently alluded to the importance of developmental processes: “Possibly each 
defense mechanism is first evolved in order to master some specific instinctual urge and 
so it associated with a particular phase of infantile development” (Freud, 1966, p. 51). 
Melanie Klein’s work describing the schizoid and depressive positions takes this idea as 
its foundation.  
Heinz Hartmann 
Often referred to as the father of ego psychology, Heinz Hartmann (1894-1870) 
was interested not only in the identification and understanding of psychopathology, but in 
a broader conceptualization of psychological development. At the time he was 
developing his theories Hartmann was unique among psychologists and psychoanalysts in 
that he strove to both preserve and incorporate the foundational elements of Freudian 
drive theory, and to expand the field of psychology as a greater intellectual discipline. For 
Hartmann, this greater discipline approached psychological processes as not only 
associated with intrapsychic conflict but rather as adaptive strategies that allowed humans 
to appropriately respond to and interact with their surroundings. This theoretical position 
applied to mechanisms of defense as it did to other psychological processes. “Defense 
processes may simultaneously serve both the control of the instinctual drive and 
adaptation to the external world” (Hartmann, 1958, p. 51). In this statement, Hartmann 
both validates Freudian drive theory, acknowledging that defenses may arise to manage 
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individuals’ instinctual conflicts, and asserts that defense mechanisms have a positive 
role in healthy psychological development as an adaptive capacity. Furthermore, 
Hartmann stressed a developmental quality to defense organization, and noted that the 
adaptive function of a defense was dependent on when and how it was used during the 
lifespan. “What developed as a result of defense against an instinctual drive may grow 
into a more or less independent and more or less structured function. It may come to 
serve different functions, like adjustment, organization, and so on” (Hartmann, 1964, p. 
123). 
 One of the important ways that Hartmann expanded psychological understanding 
of defense was to reconsider the way that defense mechanisms were discussed in within 
the psychoanalytic community, which used language that described an intrapsychic, 
closed system. 
Many of us would agree today that in speaking of ‘successful defense,’ we 
refer to the fact that the function of the defense mechanisms has been 
performed, its aim has been reached- and not to the possible long-range 
outcome of health or disease. (Hartmann, 1964, p. 225) 
For Hartmann, it was important to consider how the defense mechanisms came 
into use for a person, what purposes it served (both adaptive and pathological), 
and how this broader understanding might help clinicians perform helpful 
interventions. This multifaceted approach to identifying and understanding 
patterns of defense suggested the importance of considering both the 
developmental origin of defense, as well as the current presentation of defensive 
strategies.  Not only did Hartmann call into question the inherent pathology of 
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defense operations, he also suggested that individuals might use the same defense 
in both healthy and pathological ways depending on the situation and his or her 
psychological state: 
To touch on at least one of the genetic problems involved, we can assume 
that many defense mechanisms are traceable to primitive defense actions 
against the outside world, which in part probably belong to the ego’s 
primary autonomy, and that only later, in situations of psychic conflicts, 
do they develop into what we specially call mechanisms of defense. Also, 
we can say of many of them that after having been established as such, 
they become in a secondary way invested with other functions 
(intellectualization, for example). This makes for a complicated 
overlapping of their role as resistances with various other functions they 
represent. It is because of this, that if we want to analyze defenses in a 
rational way, we have to consider their structural, their intersystemic and 
intrasystemic ramifications, beyond the aspect of resistance they offer to 
analysis. (Hartmann, 1964, pp. 151-2) 
In other words, an individual may develop a defense mechanism, such as isolation 
of affect, in an adaptive way as a child in order to help manage strong emotions 
that feel unbearable without a developmentally mature level of ego functioning. 
This defense serves to support the child’s emotional state until his ego strength is 
such that he can tolerate strong emotions in a more productive way, and the 
defense becomes less pronounced. This same individual may revert back to 
prominent use of this defense in a period of stress, perhaps while serving in the 
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military in a combat zone. The ability to distance emotion from cognition in this 
situation, which demands the control of reactivity and focused concentration, may 
allow him to survive a life-threatening situation. Thus far, all the functions of 
isolation of affect could be considered adaptive and productive. If this individual, 
however, returns from combat and the defense does not abate, Hartmann might 
consider this a shift toward a pathological presentation. This individual, if unable 
to appropriately manage and express emotion in his relationships, or feels 
dehumanized by the disconnection between his thinking and feeling, has entered 
into a stage when the defense is not serving an adaptive function, but has become 
disabling.  
 Once a defense was identified as maladaptive, Hartmann approached therapeutic 
work similarly to Freud and other drive theorists, suggesting that it was possible to 
interpret defense failure in a way that led to greater psychological integration.  
Defenses (typically) not only keep thoughts, images and instinctual drives 
out of consciousness, but also prevent their assimilation by means of 
thinking. When defensive processes break down, the mental elements 
defended against and certain connections of these elements become 
amenable to recollection and reconstruction. (Hartmann, 1958, p. 63) 
For clinicians, and important in the conceptualization of this research, Hartmann’s 
turn toward recognizing both healthy and pathological modes of psychological 
functioning has major implications for the practice of psychotherapy and the 
treatment of individual patients. The understanding that even highly maladaptive 
defense patterns may have originated from an adaptive period of psychological 
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growth suggests the enormous possibility of human change. Though many 
patients come to therapy because previously adaptive strategies are no longer 
viable, Hartmann’s work also alerted clinicians to the possibility of not simply 
eradicating or replacing problematic patterns, but to move back toward a healthier 
manifestation of a foundational defensive style.  
Melanie Klein  
Melanie Klein (1882-1960) emphasized intrapsychic development beginning as 
early as infancy, one of her major areas of divergence from Sigmund Freud, who 
analyzed children but did not speak about ego development prior to age five or six. This 
move toward an object-relations perspective is evident in her writings about the 
foundations of anxiety. 
The analysis of very young children has taught me that there is no instinctual 
urge, no anxiety situation, no mental process which does not involve objects, 
external or internal; in other words, object relations are at the centre of emotional 
life. (Klein, 1986, p. 206) 
Melanie Klein further advanced Freud’s theoretical ideas related to defenses with 
particular attention to defense organization as it relates to developmental stages. Perhaps 
her greatest contribution to the field of psychoanalysis was her identification of two 
major developmental processes during infancy: she couched these processes in stage 
theory, and introduced the concepts of the paranoid-schizoid and the depressive positions. 
Klein had a keen eye for developmental changes in ego development based on her years 
of analytic work with children and these developmental issues are the core of her 
understanding of these two positions. During infancy, Klein posited that the child exists 
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in “two polarized states, dramatically contrasting in both conceptual organization and 
tone” (Mitchell & Black, 1994, p. 92). This division between states of existence is present 
long before the ability to reality-test, and allows the infant to compartmentalize loving 
and destructive feelings so that the latter does not annihilate the former.  
Every external or internal stimulus (e.g. every real frustration) is fraught with the 
utmost danger: not only the bad objects but also the good ones are thus menaced 
by the id, for every access of hate or anxiety may temporarily abolish the 
differentiation and thus result in a ‘loss of the loved object’. (Klein, 1986, p. 120) 
The separation of affective states and perception of objects as “good” or “bad” 
characterizes the paranoid-schizoid position. Here, “schizoid refers to the central defense: 
splitting, the vigilant separation of the loving and loved good breast from the hating and 
hated bad breast” (Mitchell & Back, 1994, p. 93). Klein describes the infant’s experience 
of the world in this way: 
The comfort and care given after birth, particularly the first feeding experiences, 
are felt to come from good forces. In speaking of ‘forces’ I am using a rather adult 
word for what the young infant dimly conceives of as objects, either good or bad. 
The infant directs his feelings of gratification and love toward the ‘good’ breast, 
and his destructive impulses and feelings of persecution toward what he feels to 
be frustrating, i.e. the ‘bad’ breast.  At this stage splitting processes are at their 
height, and love and hate as well as the good and bad aspects of the breast are 
largely kept apart from one another. (Klein, 1986, p. 202) 
As the infant develops and begins to acquire greater capacity for cognition and 
reality testing, Klein understood the central psychological process to be integration of the 
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good and bad elements of the world, including the good and bad elements within one 
object. The movement toward the depressive position is facilitated by this integration. 
The depressive position moves beyond a general sense of persecution and into an 
economy of guilt: the child is aware of the damage he or she can do to loved objects. The 
child becomes aware of his or her own power. At this time, the child’s “belief in her own 
capacity for reparation is crucial to the ability to sustain the depressive position” 
(Mitchell & Black, 1994, p. 95). In other words, the child has to navigate the complex 
interpersonal waters of “give and take” and “to believe that her love is stronger than her 
hate” (Mitchell & Black, 1994, p. 95). The differences between these two positions are 
important to a review of defense mechanisms because in each position different strategies 
(defenses) to manage very different states of anxiety are called into action.  
Melanie Klein describes the infant experience of managing loving and aggressive 
impulses, and posits that primitive defenses are the result of human beings’ earliest 
attempts to manage these conflicting emotional states. “The baby’s impulses and feelings 
are accompanied by a kind of mental activity which I take to be the most primitive one: 
that is phantasy-building, or more colloquially, imaginative thinking” (Klein, 1975, p. 
60).  Her comments here support Anna Freud’s assertion that fantasy is integral to 
childhood development, and that imaginative thinking is the first way by which a child 
makes sense of the world.  
 Klein writes prolifically on the defensive use of splitting and her work in this area 
is particularly relevant to this project.  
I have, for many years, attributed great importance to one particular process of 
splitting, the division of the breast into a good and bad object.  I took this to be an 
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expression of the innate conflict between love and hate and the ensuing anxieties. 
(Klein, 1986, p. 216) 
For Klein, like Freud, individuals use whatever resources at his or her disposal to manage 
seemingly unmanageable feelings of anxiety, and Klein clearly identifies splitting as one 
of the earliest forms of defense. 
Splitting, omnipotence, denial, and control of internal and external objects are 
dominant at that [the first three or four months] stage. These first methods of 
defense are of an extreme nature, in keeping with the intensity of early emotions 
and the limited capacity of the ego to bear acute anxiety. (Klein, 1975, p. 70) 
The act of “splitting,” in this way, is seen as a natural developmental process, albeit one 
that must be outgrown as maturation occurs. “Splitting normally succeeds only 
temporarily or partially. When it fails, the infant’s persecutory anxiety is intense” (Klein, 
1975, p. 241). Because splitting is not a sustainable way of managing anxiety as the 
infant develops, reality based defenses must emerge as primary strategies. Klein suggests 
the pathology that may follow if splitting continues as a primary force: 
If the split between the two aspects of the object is too deep, the all-important 
processes of ego integration and object synthesis, as well as of mitigation of 
hatred by love, are impaired and the depressive position cannot be worked 
through. A very deep and sharp division between loved and hated objects 
indicates that destructive impulses, envy and persecutory anxiety are very strong 
and serve as a defense against these emotions. (Klein, 1986, p. 217) 
Here, splitting becomes a barrier to adaptive human development, and an expected 
maturational process is frustrated.  
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 Even in healthy development, Klein asserts that no defense is fully left behind. 
Assuming that a person adequately moves through the schizoid and depressive positions 
and accumulates a varied set of primitive and secondary defense strategies, previous 
methods are not eradicated. “For the ego, when it becomes fully identified with the 
object, does not abandon its earlier defense mechanisms” (Klein, 1986, p. 119). From a 
developmental standpoint, mature defenses will occupy a preferential position, but under 
periods of extreme stress or duress an individual will regress and revert to more primitive 
ways of managing anxiety.   
Although Klein’s writes clearly and eloquently on the subject of splitting she also 
has been criticized for using the term too broadly, in much the same way Freud used the 
term “repression.”  Otto Kernberg was one such critic, and noted that: 
Klein’s failure to consider structural factors in her theories and her lack of 
precision in the use of her own terminology, specifically in regard to splitting 
which she appears to use for all kinds of dissociated or repressed material creates 
very serious difficulties for her formulations. (Kernberg, 1984, p. 26) 
Kernberg’s own work attempted to clarify the role that splitting plays in personality 
development in a more nuanced and precise manner, and became the foundation of his 
theory of borderline pathology, which will be explored in more detail.  
W.R.D. Fairbairn 
W.R.D. Fairbairn was profoundly influenced by Melanie Klein and her followers 
although he placed significantly more importance on the infant’s early investment in 
relationships than Klein, whose writings were categorically more focused on the 
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intrapsychic experience of the individual. Like Klein, Fairbairn was fascinated with the 
schizoid position, noting that: 
The most characteristic feature of the state of infantile dependence is 
primary identification with the object. Indeed, it would not be going to far 
to say that, psychologically speaking, identification with the object and 
infantile dependence are but two aspects of the same phenomenon. 
(Fairbairn, 2005, p.53) 
Fairbairn agreed that the principal project of the infant is to move from this primary 
identification state of the schizoid position to the depressive state, in which mature 
dependence, characterized by “a relationship between two independent individuals, who 
are completely differentiated from one another as mutual objects,” (Fairbairn, 2005, p. 
53), is achieved. Although Fairbairn did not describe particular defense mechanisms in 
the same detail as Anna Freud or Klein, he was clear that there were two distinct 
purposes in the use and deployment of defenses:  
Where a schizoid tendency is present, the defensive techniques represent 
methods designed to avert the ultimate psychopathological disaster which 
follows from loss of the ego, and where a depressive tendency is present, 
they represent methods designed to avert the ultimate psychopathological 
disaster which follows from loss of the object. (Fairbairn, 2005, p. 63) 
 During the transition from the schizoid to depressive position, Fairbairn 
posited that the infant created his or her internal experience by the process of 
internalizing experiences with the external world. In this way, Fairbairn sees 
introjection as more relevant than projection during this developmental period, 
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and this differentiation is fundamental to his theoretical divergence from Klein’s 
work. While Klein and Fairbairn both emphasized the role of splitting in the 
schizoid position, Klein focused on “the infant’s role in projecting and splitting of 
the object. She thought the infant mainly tried to get unpleasant experience and 
affect outside the self by locating it in the mother” (Scharff, 2005, p. 7). Fairbairn, 
on the other hand, believed that the splitting occurred internally – an ego split – 
and was “accompanied by repression, that is, disposing of unpleasant internalized 
relationships by splitting them off from the main core of the self and burying 
them” (Scharff, 2005, p. 7). This description of the self as a repository of “parts” 
of self, some available to consciousness and some repressed, sets up Fairbairn’s 
philosophy of psychoanalytic treatment, of which he says “the chief aim… is to 
promote a maximum ‘synthesis’ of structures into which the ego has been split” 
(Fairbairn, 2005, p. 102).   
Otto Kernberg  
   Otto Kernberg, in his seminal works on borderline personality organization, 
masterfully linked defensive functions to psychopathology and neurotic presentations. 
The term “borderline” came to exist in the 1950’s when therapists began to notice a 
particular group of patients that, while primarily diagnostically rooted in the neurotic 
range, lacked capacity for certain types of introspection, presented with severe mood-
swings and transference regression, and manifested some psychotic symptoms when 
experiencing significant stress. Because these “types” of patients did not seem to share 
overall similarities in the particulars of their presentations, “the term borderline was a 
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very broad one, somewhat synonymous with ‘the difficult patient’” (Kernberg, 1989, p. 
3).   
Kernberg posited a developmental model of the mind based on psychoanalytic 
theory, using complementary elements of Freudian, Jacobsonian and Kleinian theory. His 
ideas about necessary developmental processes are in line with many of Klein’s 
formulations. In order to understand the etymology of the term “borderline” it is 
important to understand the particular way that Kernberg used this descriptor. For 
Kernberg, “borderline” referred to a developmental tier of psychological development, 
operating in between the more profoundly disturbed psychotic individual and the more 
psychologically healthy neurotic individual. Kernberg understood a person with 
borderline personality organization as generally experiencing appropriate differentiation 
between self and other, but lacking the ability to integrate ambiguous feelings (e.g. love 
and hate) toward others.  
For Kernberg, like Klein, the infant’s first psychological task is to create 
psychological autonomy, and to appropriately differentiate between self and other. 
Failure to accomplish this task is, in Kernberg’s view, the foundation of all psychotic 
states. Without reliable differentiation between what is self and what is other, a clear 
distinction between internal and external, between reality and fantasy, is impossible.  
Even after an adequate individuation of self has been attained, Kernberg 
understood the psyche to maintain affective segregation between good and bad parts of 
the self and others. Like Klein, Kernberg understood the ego-development of the infant as 
still inchoate, and therefore the task of simultaneously holding loving and aggressive 
impulses is still impossible. Slowly integrating these affective states, or learning that 
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objects may be perceived as both good and bad simultaneously (echoing Klein’s 
understanding of movement into the depressive position), is the psychological project of 
the individuated infant. A failure to overcome this state of splitting, according to 
Kernberg, results in borderline personality organization.  
Patients in this “borderline” category have historically been seen as a particularly 
challenging population in treatment settings. Many individuals with borderline 
personality organization are quite functional, but experience significant interpersonal 
problems and complex relationships with his or her own identity. Patients with borderline 
personality structure are often associated with high levels of primitive defense, but are 
not as frequently identified or hospitalized as psychotically organized individuals 
(Davison, 2000). McWilliams asserts that:  
One of the most striking features of people with borderline personality 
organization is their use of primitive defense. Because they rely on such 
archaic and global operations as denial, projective identification, and 
splitting, when they are regressed they can be hard to distinguish from 
psychotic patients. (McWilliams, 2011, p. 63) 
As discussed above, Kernberg’s “borderline” personality organization refers to a 
developmental psychological structure, and is not the same as the contemporary diagnosis 
of borderline personality disorder. However, this diagnosis shares some important 
characteristics with individuals identified as organizationally borderline, and there is 
evidence that the structural elements identified by Kernberg are likely to inform 
behaviors that are identified as symptoms of borderline personality disorder in the DSM 
5.  
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Diagnostic criteria for borderline personality disorder do not include particular 
patterns of defense use. However, because the use of primitive defenses can manifest as 
behaviors or symptoms associated with Borderline Personality Disorder (for example, 
one of the DSM 5 criteria for Borderline Personality Disorder: “a pattern of unstable and 
intense interpersonal relationships characterized by alternating between extremes of 
idealization and devaluation” aptly describes the residual consequences of splitting), 
literature about this diagnostic group is helpful in grounding our overview. Borderline or 
“difficult” patients are often deemed more difficult to work with in long-term 
psychotherapy, quite often because of irregular treatment adherence and early 
termination. Bender (2005) neatly summarizes this in her paper on therapeutic alliance in 
the treatment of personality disorders (which includes discussion of borderline 
personality disorders as well as other Cluster B (DSM-IV-TR) disorders):  
Patients with narcissistic, borderline and paranoid personality traits are 
likely to have troubled interpersonal attitudes and behaviors that will 
complicate the patient’s engagement with the therapist.  While a strong 
positive therapeutic alliance is predictive of more successful treatment 
outcomes, strains and ruptures in the alliance may lead to premature 
treatment of termination. (2005, p. 73) 
This description nicely depicts the way that traits of individuals typically diagnosed with 
a personality disorder influence interpersonal relationships in a way that is relevant to 
psychotherapy and behavioral interventions. Specifically, she highlights the point that:  
These categories [DSM diagnostic groups] do not adequately capture the 
complexity of character pathology and that clinicians also need to consider which 
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aspects of a patient’s personality pathology are dominant at the moment in 
considering salient elements of the therapeutic alliance. (Bender, 2005, p. 73) 
This observation supports to Kernberg’s clinical observation that: 
Borderline patients oscillate between narcissistic expectations—that little will be 
required of them and much will be given to them—and profound feelings of 
distrust—with the belief that they will be treated malevolently and must protect 
themselves from the therapist. (Kernberg, 1989, p. 35) 
Acknowledging the ways that defensive structures serve to “protect” individuals from 
anxiety, deregulation, and even, as Kernberg posits, “the therapist,” speaks to the positive 
intention of defensive behaviors. Kernberg, like Hartmann before him, stresses the 
protective function of these actions, and not just the maladaptive consequences. 
Contemporary Ideas about Defense Mechanisms and Clinical Practice 
 Because this research is interested in the clinical value of identifying a 
relationship between primitive defense mechanisms and premature termination from 
therapy, this section summarizes the influences of George E. Vaillant and Nancy 
McWilliams, both of whom have made great contributions to the literature on clinical 
applications of defense theory.  
George E. Vaillant 
George E. Vaillant has devoted much of his professional career seeking ways to 
categorize, operationalize, and empirically study defense mechanisms. His research has 
led to clearly articulated suggestions for clinicians working with patients with various 
presentations of defense style, differentiating appropriate interventions, for example, 
between patients who use borderline and neurotic styles of defense. Vaillant endorses a 
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hierarchy of defense mechanisms, and organizes them into four major categories: mature 
defenses, psychotic defenses, neurotic defenses, and immature defenses.  For Vaillant, 
mature defenses are those employed by individuals with healthy psychological 
functioning, and help maintain ego stability in a productive way. “Mature defenses 
require no response from the clinician- other than verbal admiration” (1992, p. 60).  
Psychotic defenses are primary in individuals who qualify for psychotic diagnoses, and 
Vaillant sees these patients as unavailable for traditional psychoanalytic interpretative 
strategies. “In the case of psychotic distortion, delusional projection, and denial of 
external reality, the brain is not working well enough for psychotherapeutic intervention” 
(1992, p. 60). Vaillant described only the neurotic and immature defenses as amenable to 
interpretation in psychotherapy, and specified that each must be approached in a distinct 
way.  
 For neurotic patients, interpretation is the meat of therapeutic work, as it allows 
the patients to identify, reflect upon, and work with the defensive operations that 
contribute to his or her unhappiness.  
Neurotic individuals suffer from their defenses (e.g., repression, isolation, 
reaction formation and displacement) and thus welcome insight and view 
interpretation of their defenses as helpful. In contrast, the defenses of patients 
with personality disorders often only make others suffer; the owners view 
interpretations of their defenses as an unwarranted attack. (1992, p. 61) 
For personality-disordered patients, comparable to Kernberg’s “borderline” patients, 
defenses “have become part of the warp and woof of their life histories and of their 
personal identities” (1992, p. 61). Vaillant cautions that the same strategies of 
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interpretation that bring relief to neurotic individuals can deregulate individuals relying 
heavily on immature defense. “By carelessly threatening an immature defense, a clinician 
can evoke enormous anxiety and depression in the patient and rupture the therapist-
patient relationship” (1992, p. 62). 
Vaillant describes three components he believes are necessary for the task of 
“enabling patients to replace immature defenses with more mature defenses: stabilizing 
the external environment, altering the internal environment, and controlling 
countertransference” (1992, p. 63). In essence, Vaillant prescribes slow and careful 
decisions about destabilizing immature defenses until a patient has taken the opportunity 
to develop an arsenal of neurotic or mature defenses with which to replace previous 
maladaptive strategies. Similar to Kernberg, Vaillant emphasized that therapeutic 
interventions are heavily dependent on personality organization and that an approach that 
is ideal for one patient may be counterproductive or even disastrous for another. For this 
reason, identifying the modes of defense utilized by each patient is imperative. Relevant 
to this study is the idea that early identification of defense patterns may allow the 
clinician to consider the first treatment intervention the actual process of encouraging 
treatment adherence, and tailoring the early sessions accordingly. 
Nancy McWilliams 
 Nancy McWilliams provides a lovely description of various defense mechanisms 
(both primitive and secondary) in her book, Psychoanalytic Diagnosis, 2nd Edition. 
Although this book is not intended as a guidebook for the practice of psychotherapy, 
McWilliams aims to provide clinicians with helpful summaries of diagnostic principles 
that assist in appropriate diagnosis and treatment of individuals with a variety of 
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personality structures. Essential to her formulations are the identification of personality 
organization (neurotic, borderline, and psychotic) as well as the particular defense 
patterns and relational patterns that emerge when treating different patients. Like the ego 
psychologists, McWilliams asserts that defense mechanisms are not inherently 
pathological, and that significant psychological problems may be seen in patients who are 
psychologically under-defended as well as in patients that use defense to extremes. 
“Analytically influenced therapists have sometimes understood certain problems, notably 
psychotic and close-to-psychotic “decompensations,” as evidence of insufficient 
defenses” (McWilliams, 2011, p. 101). Diagnosis, for McWilliams, operates on both 
vertical and horizontal levels: one can identify the overall character structure of a patient 
(e.g. psychopathic, masochistic, depressive, narcissistic, etc.) and then further determine 
the level of personality organization of that same individual (e.g. psychotic, borderline, or 
neurotic). Expectedly, individuals within these groups can be expected to present 
differently, and to use different mechanisms of defense. That being said, McWilliams 
identified particular defense mechanisms that are highly associated with different 
character structures, and notes that more primitive uses of these defenses are associated 
with the particular level of personality organization. For example, a neurotically 
organized paranoid character may use projection, but in a way that still preserves an 
“observing ego” part of the self. This ability to recognize that one is projecting suggests 
an ability to self-reflect that is available to the neurotic patient but not the psychotic 
patient, who may use projective identification in a completely ego-dystonic way 
(McWilliams, 2011).  
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 For these reasons, according to McWilliams, patients who use primitive defense 
can be found within all character organization, and primitive defense use is not only 
associated with specific mental health diagnoses. Individuals experiencing high levels of 
distress, regardless of mental health diagnosis, are more vulnerable to primitive defense 
styles that may manifest in many areas of functioning. “Primitive defenses operate in a 
global, undifferentiated way in a person’s total sensorium, fusing cognitive, affective, and 
behavioral dimensions, whereas more advanced ones make specific transformations of 
thought, feeling, sensation, or behavior, or some combination of these” (McWilliams, 
2011, p.102) 
McWilliams invites clinicians to be sensitive to the ways that the clinician’s own 
personality structure can favor particular modes of intervention, and how this approach 
may derail the therapy. “If a person with this psychology [referring to a depressive 
character] and its corresponding therapeutic ideology were to treat a patient whose 
psychological economy worked in an opposite way… the results could be disastrous” 
(McWilliams, 1999, p. 112). Hypothetically, we might consider a therapist conveying 
warmth and empathy to a patient who has come for treatment for the first time. With 
many patients, this position is considered inviting and supportive. For some patients, 
however, this invitation for closeness may activate a need to defend against intimacy, 
which feels invasive and overwhelming. This is not to suggest that therapists should be 
able to accurately identify an individual’s needs and personality structure immediately 
upon meeting, but rather to recognize that even the most intuitive therapeutic skills or 
choices may have very different effects on patients with more disorganized personality 
structures.  
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Another clinically useful approach to assessing defense requires the clinician to 
assess whether defensive reactions represent characterological or situational responses to 
the environment. McWilliams notes that a person manifesting a characterological defense 
pattern will use that defense “in almost any circumstance” (1999, p. 90), whereas a 
situational response may be elicited only by a particularly provocative condition. One 
reason that using projective assessment can help in determining whether defense styles 
are characterological or situational is that this task introduces another “circumstance” into 
the therapy situation; if, for example, a person’s Rorschach responses show high levels of 
devaluation, the person demonstrates devaluing attitudes about others in her description 
of friends and family, and the therapist feels rejected and minimized by the patient, there 
are three different reference points that indicate this as a central defense.  
Regardless of the identified defense, attempting to understand the purpose of the 
defensive act is crucial. “For clinical purposes, it is more important to know the meaning 
of a person’s behavior than to describe that behavior accurately the way an external 
observer would” (McWilliams, 1999, p. 87). The patient who comes to one session and 
then does not return for the next scheduled session can be accurately described as 
“leaving treatment.” However, it is important to understand the meaning of that behavior 
if one aims to accurately interpret the function of the behavior. Did the patient have a 
strong reaction to the therapist, who reminded him of his abusive grandmother? Did the 
patient suddenly take a new job and was too busy and distracted to call to cancel his 
session? The meaning of the behavior drastically changes the understanding of the 
motivation and the psychological importance that one ascribes to it, and curiosity about 
one possible meaning of premature termination was the impetus for this research project. 
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Clinically speaking, the finding of this research aim to help clinicians understand some 
patients’ behaviors in a way that will allow an appropriate approach to treatment. As 
McWilliams aptly states: “in order to help a person, we need to appreciate the particular 
way in which he or she is using thoughts, feelings, and actions to relieve upsetting 
internal states” (1999, p. 87).  
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Chapter Three 
Assessment and the Lerner Defense Scales 
The Assessment Situation 
Assessment is a clinical and therapeutic resource, used for the purpose of guiding 
and facilitating interventions that identify psychological needs and respond to these in the 
way that best serves the patient’s mental health. Particularly when employing therapeutic, 
relational, and collaborative assessment (Fischer, 1994), testing gives clinicians an 
opportunity to explore how individuals take up relational processes and to identify 
therapeutic goals, techniques, and challenges very early in the intervention process.  
Psychodynamic assessment takes a “patient-first” perspective, insisting that 
testing tools are most useful when data is interpreted in relation to the overall clinical 
profile of each patient. “A psychoanalytic approach has a clinical orientation. Here, one is 
assessing, not measuring; the patient, rather than the test, is regarded as the centerpiece; 
and the assessment is conducted in a manner and style consistent with clinical purposes” 
(Lerner, 1998, p. 4). Lerner goes on to assert that diagnosis is not necessarily the end-
goal of assessment practices. 
From a clinical perspective, the ultimate purpose of an assessment is not the 
achieving of a diagnosis and the assigning of a diagnostic label. Instead, one 
attempts to understand the testee in his or her totality, complexity, and 
uniqueness, and then use that understanding as a basis for making decisions and 
suggesting interventions that will be beneficial to that individual. (Lerner, 1998, 
p. 4) 
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In the pursuit of understanding personality structures, defense organization, and relational 
patterns it is this attention to the complexity of the individual that generates useful 
clinical material.  
Assessment procedures allow access not only to important information about the 
patient, but insight into relational dynamics between patient and therapist, and patient and 
the process of therapy itself.  “The testing situation has many dynamic implications 
which actively contribute to the response process for all but the healthiest individuals” 
(Cooper, Perry & Arnow, 1988, p. 189).  This information includes insight into ways that 
the patient relates to others, to the unusual and intimate experience of therapeutic 
interaction, and to the self in high-stress situations.  Individuals who are particularly 
sensitive to interpersonal dynamics, have developed strong defenses in the service of 
avoiding conflict, or experience confrontation as a threat to self or identity may be 
particularly prone to experiencing therapy in negative ways.  Early assessment may 
illuminate a patient’s tendencies to run from, undo, or avoid certain difficult elements of 
the therapeutic process.  
 The assessment situation, approached dynamically, is a way to understand a 
patient’s experience of the world in general by carefully examining response to the 
testing itself. “A core assumption to psychological testing is that every behavior segment 
bears the imprint of the organization of the behaving personality” (Lerner, 1998, p.9). For 
many patients, assessment and therapy are fraught with anxiety. An individual typically 
comes into treatment because of concerns (this or her own or the concerns of others) 
about mental health or adaptation and the examiner or clinician is thus in a position of 
power. Freud and Klein’s attention to anxiety as the root cause of neurotic responses 
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helps us frame the ways that early therapy or assessment situations can set the conditions 
to quickly access a patient’s defensive strategies.  
If anxiety is the sentinel on the tower sounding the alarm, the defenses are the 
troops mobilized to check the invader. Defensive maneuvers may be far harder to 
track down than anxiety, for they work almost entirely under the protective, 
scarcely penetrable cover of the unconscious. But like anxiety, the defenses are 
ledged in the ego; like anxiety, they are indispensable, all too human and all to 
fallible ways of managing. In fact, one of the most momentous things to be said 
about the defenses is that, from having been the assiduous servants of adaptation, 
they may turn into intransigent obstacles to it. (Gay, 1988, p. 488) 
In an anxiety-provoking situation, defenses are likely to manifest quickly. The inherent 
tension of the assessment process is at once destabilizing and demanding, and watching 
the ways that an individual manages these requests and challenges gives important 
information about his or her strategies of self-regulation under pressure.  
[Schafer] notes that under such challenges [intimate communication and violation 
of privacy without trust; the relinquishment of control of the relationship; 
exposure to the dangers of confrontation and premature self-awareness; regressive 
temptations and the dangers of freedom] and anxiety arousing conditions it is 
inevitable that defensive and transference reactions will be stimulated or 
exacerbated.  Such reactions, he suggests, are not to be avoided, minimized, or 
ignored, but rather are to be scrutinized as one would any clinical experience, for 
they provide an important basis for understanding the patient. (Lerner, 1998, p. 
96) 
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Before formalized assessment practices were developed, the therapy room was the space 
where these responses to stress and anxiety were more closely observed and studied. 
Anna Freud describes the analytic session as the ideal setting to observe defense 
mechanisms in action:  
The analyst has an opportunity of witnessing, then and there, the putting into 
operation by the latter [the patient] one of those defensive measures against the id 
which I have already described and which are so obscure, and it now behooves 
him to make it the object of his investigation. (1966, p. 14)   
Freud understood the analyst as a catalyst for the introduction of defense when the 
process of therapy disturbs the typical psychological regulation of the patient.  
Insofar as the ego institutions have endeavored to restrain the id impulses by 
methods of their own, the analyst comes on the scene as a disturber of the peace… 
except insofar as the patient’s insight into his illness determines matter otherwise, 
the ego institutions regard the analyst’s purpose as a menace. (Freud, 1966, 29) 
As a “menace” to the ego institutions, the analyst or therapist is perceived as a danger, 
which increases anxiety and raises the defenses in order to neutralize the situation. The 
informed clinician, curious about and sensitive to the various manifestations of defense 
processes, can use this situation to develop formulations about the ways a patient 
employs defense and how this contributes to the response to treatment.  
 The assessor holds a similar, perhaps exaggerated, position of “menace” to the 
ego. Assessment situations are typically less conversational than therapy sessions, and 
because the patient is aware of being “examined” or “evaluated,” the potential for 
anxious response is increased. Furthermore, because of standardized test administration 
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procedures, assessors are often less able to respond to or empathize with the patient in 
typical ways.  
Since the testing situation is not usually experienced by patients as optimally 
empathetic it becomes an excellent opportunity to study how a patient responds to 
less than optimal empathy.  This understanding can sharpen the therapist’s 
awareness of a patient’s response to the inevitable empathetic failures of the 
therapist. (Arnow and Cooper, 1998, p. 54) 
In situations that allow a single clinician to function as both the assessor and the therapist, 
assessment can provide particular value at the outset of an individual’s treatment. 
“Because of the similarities between the assessment and treatment frames, the examiner 
who explicitly sets the assessment frame and then observes the patient responses to it is 
in a unique position to predict patient reactions to the treatment frame” (Lerner, 1998, p. 
68). 
Many assessment tools are useful in exploring interpersonal dynamics and 
personality structure. Connie Fischer (1994) pioneered collaborative approaches to 
assessment processes that allow for almost any test to be interpreted according to both 
standardized and individualized measures. The Rorschach Inkblot Test (The Rorschach) 
is a particularly useful tool in assessing ways the patient approaches ambiguous situations 
and solves novel problems. The Rorschach is defined as a “projective test” because of the 
unstructured nature of test stimulus and the subjective nature of response patterns. The 
Rorschach stands out among the projective tests because of the body of empirical 
research validating its sensitivity and efficacy at identifying important elements of 
psychological functioning (Lerner, 2008; Meyer, Hsiao, Viglione, Mihura, & Abraham, 
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2013, Atkinson, L. & Quarrington, B., Alp, I.E., & Cyr, J.J., 2011). “As a result [of 
rigorous scientific investigation], what at one time was considered Rorschach lore is now 
a sound body of knowledge, which furnishes a sturdy basis for Rorschach interpretation” 
(Lerner, 1998, p. 7).   
The Rorschach is an ideal assessment tool for exploring relational dynamics. “Of 
particular importance in discussing the test situation is the consideration that Rorschach 
assessment takes place in an interpersonal context” (Lerner, 1998, p. 67). This 
interpersonal context was one of several reasons Lerner and Lerner chose to use the 
Rorschach as the foundational assessment tool for the Lerner Defense Scales.  
 
The Lerner Defense Scales 
 The Lerner Defense Scales (LDS) were constructed to specifically and 
“systemically assess and score the primitive defenses of the borderline patient” (Lerner, 
1980, p. 257). Paul Lerner and Howard Lerner believed that the primitive ego defenses 
identified by Kernberg (splitting, projective identification, denial, devaluation, and 
idealization) “become manifest in the patient’s object relations” (Lerner, 1980, p. 257), 
and that these approaches to object relations could be measured with projective tests.  
Historically, there have been few psychological tests that have specifically 
identified particular types of defenses within individual patients.  In 1980, P. Lerner and 
H. Lerner, based on the theoretical and clinical work of Kernberg, Mayman, Holt, and 
Peebles, “devised a Rorschach scoring manual designed to evaluate the specific defensive 
operations presumed to characterize the developmentally lower level of defensive 
functioning” (Lerner, 1998, p. 271). This “Rorschach scoring manual” later became 
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known as the Lerner Defense Scales. These scales, scored from Rorschach responses that 
describe Human Movement, identify primitive defenses, specifically splitting, 
devaluation and idealization, projective identification and denial.  The construction of the 
Lerner Defense Scales was based on Kernberg’s theoretical assertion that this 
constellation of “lower-level primitive defenses distinguishes borderline and psychotic 
patients, on the one hand, from neurotic patients, on the other” (Lerner, 1998, p. 279). In 
order to evaluate the construct validity of the scales, “initial validating studies involved 
comparing the Rorschach records of borderline patients with the protocols of other 
clinical groups” (Lerner, 1998, p. 279).  The results of these studies showed that certain 
primitive defenses (splitting and projective identification) were “observed exclusively in 
the borderline groups” (Lerner, 1998, p. 280), whereas high-level scores on idealization 
and devaluation were found more predominantly in the neurotic groups. Studies that 
examined the primitive defense constellations in borderline and schizophrenic patients 
found different patterns of defense manifestation based on diagnostic categories, 
suggesting that particular primitive defenses are more often employed in patients with 
different manifest symptoms (i.e. schizophrenic patients were more likely to use 
projective identification) (Stuart et al, 1990; Blais, Hilsenroth, & Fowler, 1998; Greene, 
1988; Bond, 2004; Leichsenring, 1999; Hilsenroth, Hibbard, Nash, & Handler, 1993). 
The results of these studies “not only support theoretical propositions, they coincide with 
clinical experience as well” (Lerner, 1998, p. 280). Numerous other studies have 
demonstrated the validity of the Lerner Defense Scales in identifying primitive defense 
use (Lerner, Sugarman, and Barbour, 1985; Van der Keshet, 1988; Collins, 1983; Farris, 
1998; Piran et al., 1988). 
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The Lerner Defense Scales have also demonstrated good reliability. In Lerner’s 
initial investigation, inter-rater scoring reliability between two independently trained 
raters ranged from 83-100% perfect agreement. In subsequent tests, inter-rater reliability 
showed similar levels of agreement: In Van-Der Keshet’s 1988 study, “Anorexic Patients 
and Ballet Students: A Rorschach Analysis,” inter-rater reliability was 80-100% perfect 
agreement, and in Gacano’s 1988 dissertation, “A Rorschach Analysis of Object 
Relations and Defensive Structure and their Relationship to Narcissism and Psychopathy 
in a Group of Antisocial Offenders,” he reported inter-rater reliability percentages 
between 88-100%. Lerner (1998) writes: “results from various studies indicate that the 
reliability of the scoring system for the Lerner Defense Scale, as judged by level of inter-
rater agreement, is particularly high for an inkblot measure” (p. 279).   
 Scoring the Lerner Defense Scales requires specific training but is not a difficult 
task.  Lerner and Lerner (1980) clearly describe the scoring process, which is 
summarized here.   
 Only Human Movement responses are examined.  Some protocols may have 
many and others, including ones used in this research, have none.   
 These responses may contain any combination of the five primitive defenses, each 
of which are coded according to particular criteria. Each protocol is scored for 
each of these defenses, resulting in a numerical value representing the presence of 
each within the responses.  Most defenses are scored on a scale (devaluation is 
scored 1-5, idealization 1-5, and denial 1-3)3; splitting and projective 
                                                 
3 For the scaled defenses, responses that devalue or destroy the humanness of the percept receive a 
higher score; for example, a high devaluation score would involved a de-humanized figure (an 
alien) who is also described in negative terms (ex: an alien with a missing leg; some sort of 
creature whose head has been cut off) 
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identification are not scored on a scale, and the presence of either in a response is 
scored as 1 point per response.  
 Following the lead of Lerner and Lerner as well as other investigators (Hilsenroth 
et al.), each response is individually scored and then all of the scores for that 
particular defense are summed to generate the overall score for the protocol.  For 
example, a protocol with three devaluation scores (at levels 3, 4, and 1) would 
receive a total devaluation score of 8. This summed score is divided by the total 
number of human responses in order to generate the mean score for each protocol.  
For example, a devaluation score of 8, in a protocol containing 8 Human 
responses, will generate an overall mean devaluation score of 1.0 for the protocol. 
This mean is considered the final score for that defense. The Lerner Defense 
Scales have not been normed. 
The following, a description of responses scored for splitting, is sourced from 
Lerner’s scoring guidelines, published in 1980.  
“Splitting refers to what a person does with his inner and outer objects. More 
specifically, it involves a division of internal and external into (1) parts, as distinct 
from wholes, and (2) good and bad part-objects… Score splitting in the following 
cases.  
 A human percept described in terms of a specific, nonambivalent, nonambiguous 
affective dimension is immediately followed by another human response in which 
the affective description is opposite. Ex: ‘looks like an ugly criminal with a gun’ 
immediately followed by ‘couples sitting together cheek to cheek’  
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 In the description of one total human figure a clear distinction of parts is made, so 
that one part of the figure is seen as opposite another part” Ex: ‘A giant. His lower 
part here conveys danger, but his top half looks benign’  
 Included in one response are two clearly distinguished figures, and these figures 
are described in opposite ways”. Ex: ‘Two figures, a man and a woman. He is 
mean and shouting at her. Being rather angelic, she is standing there and taking 
it’ 
 An implicitly idealized figure is tarnished or spoiled by the addition of one or 
more features, or an implicitly devalued figure is enhanced by the addition of 
more or more features. Ex: ‘a headless angel’.” (Lerner, 1998, pp. 272-3) 
Each of the other defenses measured have similar scoring guidelines. 
 For Lerner and Lerner, each defense is linked to “relational potentials,” or ways 
that the defense can be seen in interpersonal manifestations.  These types of exchanges, 
particularly those that appear to be patterns in a patient’s relational style, can be expected 
in a therapeutic relationship, as they can in all other relationships. For example:  
Projective identification is an inevitable aspect of the externalization of an 
internal object relation.  Further, in the treatment relationship there is always a 
component in the therapist’s countertransference that represents an induced 
identification with a part of the patient’s ego that is enmeshed in a particular 
unconscious internal object relation. (Lerner, 1998, pp. 84-5).   
Here, Lerner begins to illuminate the reasons that defense employment has a significant 
effect on the early therapist/patient relationship.  Throughout his writing, Lerner 
reinforces the interpersonal aspects of primitive defense, drawing on object-relations 
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theory to make this point. “Splitting, projective identification, denial, primitive 
devaluation, idealization- are represented object relationally, serve a primitive organizing 
function, and simultaneously reflect the relatively undifferentiated, incompletely 
internalized or metabolized quality of the representation” (Lerner, 1998, p. 289). 
Lerner acknowledges the Psychoanalytic Experiential Model of understanding the 
Rorschach Inkblot Test in the development of the Lerner Defense Scales. Influenced 
primarily by Schachter and Mayman and later developed further by Paul Lerner, this 
approach links Rorschach test responses “more directly to the patient’s actual 
experiences, thus offering a more experience-near understanding of the Rorschach task” 
(Lerner, 1998, p. 16).  Mayman was a strong proponent of understanding human 
movement responses as “representative samples of the testee’s inner object world… as a 
direct expression of the individual’s interpersonal experience” (Lerner, 1998, p. 16). 
Schachtel (1966) nicely describes the process of describing percepts as experience-near, 
and therefore a valuable window into the patient’s inner life when he writes:  
When one disregards specific attitudes and pays attention only to the general 
process of enlivening the percept by looking at it, not detachedly, but by putting 
oneself inside of it in imagination, by feeling from inside how it moves and lives, 
then one is concerned with those general qualities of the movement response 
which make them representative of what Rorschach called the capacity for inner 
creation and what I believe to be a factor in man’s capacity for creative 
experience [pp. 230-231]. (Lerner, 1998, p. 109)   
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Taking this one step further, Lerner emphasizes that Schachtel’s observations not only 
suggest this insight into patient experience, but also point the clinician to the patient’s 
available psychological resources. 
According to Schachtel, those attitudes that are available to the individual to use 
creatively in the act of experiencing are reflected in the kinesthetic aspect of the 
movement response.  For example, a person whose repertoire of kinesthesias, as 
reflected in Rorschach imagery, is limited to more passive activities… will either 
selectively empathize with this aspect of others of will ascribe it to them. (Lerner, 
1998, p. 110) 
This conceptualization of human movement responses, the basis for the Lerner Defense 
Scales, suggests that human movement responses can give the assessor valuable 
information about psychologically relevant relational elements of the patient, therefore 
implying direct possibilities related to the therapeutic relationship.   
 Most studies using the Lerner Defense Scales look at how scores manifest in 
particular populations identified by diagnosis.  “Because of the conceptual roots of the 
Lerner Defense Scale, initial studies using the scale were designed to evaluate the scoring 
system’s efficacy in distinguishing groups of borderline patients from groups of other 
diagnostic entities” (Lerner, 1998, p. 290). Subsequent studies looked at specific 
populations (anorexics, antisocial personalities, schizophrenic patients4) and how these 
groups’ primitive defense scores compared to other diagnostic or control populations.  
There is no research that specifically explored the relationship between Lerner Defense 
Scale scores and termination patterns. 
 
                                                 
4 See Van-Der Keshet, 1988 and Gacano, 1988  
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Chapter Four 
Method 
Data Collection Procedures 
 Data for this project was drawn from closed and archived files of patients at the 
Duquesne University Psychology Clinic, a community mental health clinic located in 
downtown Pittsburgh.  This clinic serves a diverse population of individuals presenting 
with a variety of diagnoses. This project was reviewed and approved by the Internal 
Review Board (IRB) at Duquesne University. The IRB approved the review and use of 
the following items from the patients’ files: Rorschach protocols, including the verbatim 
responses given by the patient and the final summary of treatment, written by the treating 
clinician. 
 During a pre-project exploration of the archives, 54 patient files were identified as 
containing Rorschach protocols.  Upon closer examination, many of these files were 
determined unusable for two main reasons: (a) The file included a Rorschach protocol, 
but the patient’s original responses were not included in the file and (b) The patient’s 
verbatim responses were handwritten by the clinician and were illegible to the point that 
full responses could not be translated.  If the final summary was missing, those records 
were also excluded.  After identifying records that included all the necessary information, 
35 files were included in this study.  Pairs of Rorschach protocols and final summaries 
were matched and coded, and the documents were de-identified.  
 Archived files were sourced for Rorschach protocols and treatment summaries. In 
order to create the data set, two types of data were extracted: (a) Rorschach protocols that 
archived transcripts using the patients’ verbatim language were used to create Lerner 
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Defense Scale scores and (b) final summary reports written by the treating clinician and 
containing clinical observations, number of sessions attended, and progress achieved 
during work together, were used to determine the patients’ termination status.  
 Of the 35 files used as the sample for this project, 18 patients were men (51%) 
and 17 were women (49%). Most patients (32) were between 18-55 years of age, and the 
majority of patients for whom racial identification was provided were Caucasian (92%). 
This is not representative of the general population served in mental health settings. 
However, because participants were selected based on the availability of both Rorschach 
protocols and final summaries in their medical records, demographic information was not 
considered in this selection process.   
Scoring the Lerner Defense Scales (LDS) 
 Each Rorschach protocol was scored according to the instructions laid out by 
Lerner and Lerner. The protocols were blindly scored without scorer knowledge of the 
termination group. Additional literature and previous studies were referenced when 
making scoring choices.  Because there is no codified guidebook, the scoring was 
informed by extensive literature review in order to best represent the intentions of the 
LDS authors. Each Human Movement response (or part-response that met criteria for 
projective identification) was individually scored for all defenses identified by the Lerner 
Defense Scales (splitting, devaluation, idealization, denial, and projective identification). 
Following the lead of Lerner and Lerner, the total score for each defense was calculated 
by dividing the raw score by the total number of Human Movement responses. The 
Lerner Defense Scales have not been normed on any populations, so normed comparisons 
to other groups were not possible. 
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 McWilliams’ observed that: “many defensive processes have more primitive and 
more mature forms” (2011, p. 103). Two of the defenses measured by the Lerner Defense 
Sales, idealization and devaluation, appear to measure both primitive and more mature 
forms of the defense manifestation. As McWilliams points out: “idealization can denote 
an unquestioning, worshipful conviction that another person is perfect, or it can refer to a 
subtle subdued sense that someone is special or admirable despite some visible 
limitations.” The idealization scale on the Lerner Defense Scales scores a 5 (most severe) 
when “the humanness dimension is lost” and the response describes a figure with 
supernatural powers of great power (Lerner, 1991, p. 184), whereas a score of 1 (least 
severe) is given for a description of a figure that “is described in a positive, but not 
excessively flattering way: for example, ‘two nice people looking over a fence.’” (Lerner, 
1991, p. 184). It is dubious whether a response that scores a 1 would qualify as a 
primitive defense. The devaluation scale on the Lerner Defense Scales is scored in the 
same manner as the idealization scale. For this reason, devaluation and idealization were 
grouped to form a “higher level primitive defense” group and splitting, denial and 
projective identification were grouped to form a “lower level primitive defense” group.  
 To provide a descriptive characterization that allows for comparison of relative 
differences among scales, Z-score distribution transformations were used (M=0, SD=1) 
for logistic regression analysis. This was necessary to allow for comparisons between the 
defense scores, which are calculated differently. For example, splitting is scored on an 
interval scale between 1 and 0 (0 if the response does not meet criteria for splitting and 1 
if the response demonstrates splitting) and devaluation is scored on an interval scale, 
according to severity, between 1 and 5 points). 
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 This author scored all 35 protocols. Another scorer, trained by this author and also 
familiar with the literature by Lerner and Lerner, examined half (n=17) of the protocols 
and independently scored each item. For those items with disparate scores, the scorers 
met and discussed the rationale behind the scoring decision and re-consulted the 
literature.  In cases where one score clearly had stronger support, that score was adopted.  
In cases where neither the literature nor the discussion led to a clear consensus, the 
average of the two scores was calculated and used for the final data. Inter-rater reliability 
was found to be 83%.  This value is comparable to inter-rater reliability scores 
demonstrated in other studies (Lerner, 1991). 
Scoring the Termination Status 
 Operationalizing the term “premature termination” for this study was a 
challenging task.  Parameters used to differentiate the Premature Termination Group from 
the Not Premature Termination Group were based on precedents used in previous 
research, as well as the type of information available in the patients’ final summary 
documents.  Special consideration was given to ways to differentiate “premature 
termination” from “rejecting therapy,” as discussed by Swift and Greenberg: “Premature 
termination occurs unilaterally by the client, rather than through a mutual agreement 
between the therapist and client to end treatment.  Dropping out of therapy can be 
contrasted to both completing and rejecting therapy” (2012, p. 547). Since clinicians and 
patients acknowledge that there are a multitude of reasons individuals leave therapy 
(limited financial resources, work schedules, or resolution of circumstantial stressors), it 
was important to try, even though the methods were imperfect, to differentiate between 
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premature termination that may have been based on dynamics related to therapy and 
termination related to issues unrelated to the therapy processes.  
 The method for determining the “premature” and “not premature” groups changed 
during the course of the study. The process was adapted in response to particular 
challenges encountered during the coding process as well as common practices in 
previously published research.  Originally, after reviewing relevant literature related to 
premature termination, the use of “clinician judgment” was the planned method of 
assessing premature termination.  However, because not all final treatment summaries 
included the therapist’s opinion on the matter, this turned out to be too imprecise and a 
more formalized method of assessing elements of premature termination was required.  
 There were several important factors to consider when determining assignment 
into the “premature termination” group. Based on prior research, the available data within 
the final summary, and observations made when reviewing these documents, a cluster of 
variables was identified for use in coding termination status.  These variables were: (a) 
number of sessions (for example “intake and assessment only”, 1-4 sessions, 4-8 
sessions, etc.), (b) clinician judgment, (c) evidence of external interfering circumstances 
(for example moving, the end of the semester, etc.), and (d) indications of patient 
ambivalence (scheduling and then missing multiple sessions, verbalized ambivalence). A 
termination score, based on the presence or absence of certain factors  including clinician 
judgment, evidence of external interfering circumstances and patient ambiguity and the 
length of treatment (scored between 0 and 5, with 5 representing the shortest treatment) 
was calculated and patients who met a threshold score (6 points) were assigned to the 
“premature termination group” (PTG). Individuals with scores that did not meet this 
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threshold were considered the “not premature termination group” (NPTG). 9 individuals 
(26%) were assigned to the Premature Termination Group and 26 individuals (74%) were 
assigned to the Not Premature Termination Group. The percentage of patients who fell 
into each group was commensurate with the numbers of overall premature terminators 
presented by Swift and Greenberg in their 2012 meta-analysis of patient dropout rates.  
Analytic Approach 
This study was concerned with (a) determining whether use of primitive defense 
predicted early termination from treatment and (b) describing differences in the use of 
defense types between individuals who terminated therapy prematurely versus 
individuals who did not.  
Given that the assessment situation preceded treatment, this project was able to 
evaluate whether defense use assessed during the Rorschach predicted early termination 
once individuals began treatment. To assess this aim – the predictive utility of amount of 
defense usage – binary logistic regression was performed with each defense type 
predicting membership in the termination group. The results of logistic regression 
provide estimates of the increased likelihood of terminating treatment early for each 
increase in one unit of measurement (in this case, one standard deviation unit). This is 
referred to as the odds ratio. Given theoretical presuppositions regarding similarities 
among lower-order (i.e., splitting, denial, projective identification) and higher-order (i.e., 
idealization, devaluation) defense types, scores of these scales were averaged to create 
overall indexes of Lower Order LDS versus Higher Order LDS defense types. Given that 
the scaling was different among each defense, defense, scores were transformed to a 
common metric (as described above) using a Z score distribution with a mean of one and 
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a standard deviation of zero. This transformation allowed for the varying metrics among 
each scale to be included on a common, universal metric, without losing the qualities of 
each scale’s distribution (i.e., someone with a score placing them at the 35th percentile 
would continue to be at the 35th percentile). The influence of overall defense was also 
considered by creating an averaged score across all defense types (Total Defense Score).  
To examine the difference between groups, t-tests were used to determine whether 
the groups differed in average scores for each defense type. Given that the Lerner 
Defense Scales were developed primarily to assess for presence and absence of defenses, 
use of defense types was also considered in this way and frequency distributions were 
compared between groups using Chi Squared (Χ2). The Χ2 test assesses whether the 
distribution of frequencies of defense use is the same between the two groups (i.e., the 
null hypothesis would be that there was an proportionate number of defense users in each 
group, so the expected distribution would be equally present in each of the termination 
groups).  
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Chapter Five 
Results 
Describing and differentiating the premature termination (PTG) and not-premature 
termination (NPTG) groups 
The primary goal of this study was to determine whether primitive defense use 
predicted premature termination from therapy. The null hypothesis was that primitive 
defense use would not predict premature termination.  
Before determining whether defense use predicted early termination, it was 
important to determine whether the Premature Termination Group (PTG) was 
differentiated from the Non Premature Termination Group (NPTG) by defense 
characteristics. Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics of each defense type for the total 
sample as well as for each termination group.  
 
 
Table A1.                       
                                   
         Means, standard deviations (SD), and termination group differences in defense use.    
                       Termination Group 
         
      Total (n=35)   
Premature  
(PTG) 
(n=9)   
Not Premature   
(NPTG) 
(n=26)   
         Defense Type M (SD)     M (SD)   M (SD)   
           Splitting   0.04 (0.12)     0.14 (0.21) A 0.00 (0.00) B 
           Denial   0.02 (0.04)     0.01 (0.02)   0.02 (0.04)   
           Projective Identification 0.01 (0.03)     0.02 (0.07) † 0.00 (0.00) † 
           Idealization 0.14 (0.20)     0.14 (0.32)   0.13 (0.15)   
           Devaluation 0.30 (0.27)     0.28 (0.31)   0.31 (0.27)   
         Note: Superscript letters indicate significant differences between groups (p < .05). † indicates a 
group difference that approached, but did not attain statistical significance. 
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T-Tests were run for each defense in order to assess whether the means of the 
premature termination and non-premature termination groups differed significantly in 
terms of the amount of each defense used. Because the defenses were scored on scales 
that reflected different levels of severity (two scales score between one and two, one 
scale scores between one and three, and two scales score between one and five), amount 
is relative to each scale, and reflects both the frequency and severity of the scores for 
each defense. T-tests are used to compare difference in average values between groups 
(for example, the average splitting score between the PTG and the NPTG). T-tests ask 
whether a difference between two groups’ averages is unlikely to have occurred due to 
chance. For splitting, a significant difference was found between groups such that the 
early termination group had higher average levels of splitting, t(33) = 3.43, p < .01. 
Analysis showed that variance was not significant, and so pooled variance was used as 
the measure for this test. The Premature Termination Group had higher levels of 
projective identification use; however, this effect approached but did not attain statistical 
significance, t(33) = 1.75, p = .09. There were no significant difference in mean levels of 
defense use for any other defenses measured (denial, devaluation, and idealization), all ps 
> .30. 
In order to assess whether the overall presence or absence of defense use differed 
between the groups, Chi-Square Tests (Χ2) were used. Because this tests looks at whether 
the defense was used (rather than the frequency or severity of use), the data used for this 
test simply reflected whether the protocol contained any scored responses that used the 
measured defense (i.e. if the defense was present, it was scored 1, and if it was not, it was 
scored 0). Results confirmed that the two groups differed in expected frequencies (i.e. the 
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proportion of splitting used by the premature termination group was greater than that 
expected by chance) for use of splitting, Χ2(1) = 9.48, p < .01, and 100 percent of 
individuals who used splitting terminated prematurely.  
To summarize, statistically significant differences in the use of splitting were 
found between the Premature Termination Group and the Not Premature Groups, both in 
the presence or absence of this defense, as well as in the mean scores for this defense.  
Predictive results: do defense scores predict premature termination? 
 In order to assess whether defense use had a predictive relationship to termination 
status, data was analyzed using logistic regression. Logistic regression is used to evaluate 
how one or more independent variables determine a dichotomous outcome. In this case, 
logistic regression asked whether the defense scales offered predictive value in 
determining termination status. Because the data set was highly positively skewed (i.e. 
there were many values of 0, indicating that the defense was not used), the data did not 
conform to a normal distribution and therefore violates one of the assumptions for 
regression. Consistent with recommended practices, square root and log transformations 
were applied. These transformations apply the consistent mathematical formula to each 
data point that results in a change (transformation) to the scaling of the distributions to 
approximate a normal distribution. Log transformations resulted in closer approximation 
of normal distribution; however, this transformation did not change the results of logistic 
regressions, all ps > .16. Given the null findings and the difficulties associated with 
interpreting results that include transformed variables, results are presented in raw score. 
Results of logistic regression analyses showed that none of the five defenses individually 
predicted early termination, all ps > .31.  
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 Logistic regression for groups of defenses indicated some predictive value. Given 
the scaling variations between Lerner Defense Scales, Z-distribution transformations 
(M=0, SD=1) were applied so that all defense scores could be combined using a common 
metric. Analysis of the distributional qualities of these combined scores indicated that 
there was no significant violation of the normal distribution assumption, (skewness and 
kurtosis < 3).  
For Total Defense Scores (the sum of Z-scores for all five defenses), the 
association between score and termination status approached but did not attain statistical 
significance, r(1) = 2.07, Standard Error (SE) = 1.16, Odds Ratio (OR) = 7.91, p = .08. 
For logistic regression analyses, the odds ratio is considered the best approximation of 
relative risk. This suggests that, for each 1 SD increase in Total Defense Score, there is a 
7.9 times greater likelihood that an individual will terminate prematurely.  Because the 
criterion was not met for statistical significance (p < .05), this relationship should be 
considered tentative. 
 Logistic regression for the lower order primitive defenses scale (summed Z-scores 
for splitting, denial, and projective identification) showed predictive value, r(1) =0.56, 
(SE = 0.26), OR = 1.75, p = .03. In other words, for each standard deviation increase in 
total score for lower order primitive defenses, there is a 1.75 greater likelihood that an 
individual will terminate therapy prematurely. Logistic regression did not indicate any 
predictive relationship between the higher order primitive defenses (idealization and 
devaluation) and premature termination from treatment, p > .88.  
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Chapter Six 
Discussion 
This study explored the relationship between the presence of primitive defense 
mechanisms and premature termination from psychotherapy. Specifically, it tested the 
hypotheses that 1) primitive defense scores will predict premature termination and 2) that 
there will be measurable differences between groups of patients that terminated 
prematurely and those that did not. This was evaluated using both parametric and 
nonparametric analysis of the data as well as looking for correlations between particular 
defenses and early termination. In addition, this study looked at differences between non-
premature termination and premature termination groups. This chapter provides 
interpretation of the results, conclusions based on the findings, recommendations for 
clinicians and assessors, limitations of the present study and implications for future 
research. 
Splitting as a significant descriptive factor 
Chi-Squared analysis indicated that the presence of splitting in a patient protocol 
was significant for the group that left treatment early. In fact, all individuals who 
employed splitting as a defense left treatment prematurely. Independent T-tests for each 
primitive defense also identified splitting as the defense variable that showed significance 
for difference between groups. 
Splitting was the only primitive defense that was significantly associated with 
difference between groups. This was found on both parametric and nonparametric 
measures. This suggests that the presence of splitting was clinically significant in and of 
itself, regardless of the “amount” or “frequency” with which the patient employed this 
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defense. Even though the base rate of individuals who used splitting was low, the fact 
that all individuals who were scored for splitting terminated prematurely is noteworthy.  
Prediction of Premature Termination 
Logistic regression analysis showed that the three defenses identified as “lower 
level primitive defenses” (splitting, denial and projective identification were predictive of 
premature termination from therapy. In other words, for each standard deviation increase 
in the score for lower level primitive defenses, a patient is 1.75 times more likely to leave 
therapy prematurely. The “total defense score” (the sum of all defense scores for a 
protocol) approached significance but was not statistically significant (p = .08). This 
means that there was a strong indication that a total defense score could predict early 
termination, though another study with a larger sample would be necessary to test this 
hypothesis.  
One important question is why, given that splitting was identified as the 
significant indicator of difference between groups, this variable did not have predictive 
value (e.g. was not found statistically significant when analyzed using logistic regression) 
in determining termination outcomes. One potential reason is that the sample size was too 
small and the variance too small. Because this is the first study to assess the Lerner 
Defense Scales’ relationship to premature termination there is no established effect size. 
Effect size is necessary to determine power analysis and therefore an appropriate sample 
size. Rough estimates based on similar study designs suggest that a sample size of 100 
may be appropriate for future research.  
T-tests are less affected by power than logistic regression, so the finding of 
significance for splitting in t-test analysis is promising. Furthermore, the combination of 
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variables (for example total defense score and lower level defense score groups) did show 
predictive values, suggesting that increasing the number of data points strengthens the 
relationship between defense score and premature termination. Using multiple-item 
measures, assuming they all are features of a particular construct, allows for greater 
precision in identifying the effect of that construct. 
A second theoretical argument for multiple-item measures is that a multiple-item 
measure captures more information than can be provided by a single-item 
measure. This argument comes in two forms. One argument for a multiple item 
measure capturing more information than a single-item measure is that a multiple-
item measure “is more likely to tap all facets of the construct of interest.” 
(Baumgartner and Homburg 1996, p. 143) 
Given the likelihood that this study was statistically underpowered to resolve effects 
(Type-II Error), the ability of single-item measures (i.e. each individual defense) may 
have further influenced the ability to detect effects. That said, differences between groups 
were observed with more descriptive (non-predictive) tests, suggesting that these groups 
do indeed differ.  
The finding that there is predictive power based on primitive defense use is an 
exciting outcome. This suggests that early identification of defense structure has 
applicable clinical utility in approaching treatment planning and patient collaboration. 
Psychoanalytic literature has addressed the importance of defense use in personality 
structure and psychopathology as a foundational component of diagnosis and treatment 
approach. In this study, quantitative data supports the importance of understanding and 
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responding to defensive operations in order to improve treatment adherence and improve 
therapy outcomes.  
Recommendations 
 The findings of this study suggest several intervention strategies that may be 
helpful for clinicians interested in incorporating defense assessment into clinical practice 
in order minimize premature termination for primitively defended patients.  
Including assessment as part of the intake process 
Incorporating formal assessment as part of early therapeutic processes of 
developing a case conceptualization, building rapport with the patient, and acquiring 
informed consent for treatment is strongly encouraged. Particularly for clinicians familiar 
with psychodynamic theory and projective testing, using projective tests has particular 
utility in “seeing beyond” a guarded presentation and inviting the patient to express 
patterns beyond symptoms.  
This project asserts that assessment is a powerful tool, not only in developing 
diagnostic decisions, but also as a task that provides valuable information about a 
patient’s reactions to treatment and intervention.  Assessment tools serve to gather 
information: for example, symptom profiles, evidence for particular emotional states, and 
suggestion of patient attitude toward the assessment process. These tools also can serve 
as a catalyst for a particular type of interpersonal interaction that can provide clues about 
a person’s relational style and also “set the scene” for potential interactions between 
patient and therapist moving forward.  Levine (1988) emphasizes that psychological 
assessment may “provide a framework in which to understand and unravel the complex 
interactional patterns occurring in the therapeutic process” (p. 97).   
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Assessment also provides information that can be quickly interpreted and shared 
with the patient in order to build a solid therapeutic base. Providing the patient with 
information that reflects his or her experience and informs treatment planning can be a 
great comfort to an individual who is feeling anxious, lost, or uncertain about what lies 
ahead in a therapy relationship. “When done well, assessment can have a therapeutic 
effect.  It assists individuals in understanding and gaining perspective on the nature of 
their difficulties and deciding what to do about them” (Lerner, 1998, p. 71). 
Findings from this study suggest that early identification of defense patterns may 
help clinicians recognize individuals who are likely to abandon treatment. Since early 
termination is by definition a time-sensitive issue, using assessment practices to 
recognize early indications of termination can help therapists decide upon the types of 
intervention strategies and timing of these interventions to support treatment adherence.   
Using the Lerner Defense Scales as part of early assessment practice 
For clinicians familiar with the Lerner Defense Scale, noting and identifying the 
presence of primitive defenses can be done as the test is administered. No post-test 
scoring is required for the initial identification of these defense processes. A clinician 
who chooses to administer a Rorschach during the first 1-3 intake sessions can assess for 
the presence of splitting and other lower level primitive defenses, as well as select an 
appropriate way to discuss this information with the client in a manner that will benefit 
treatment moving forward. Some patients may be appropriate candidates for a 
collaborative assessment discussion. Clinicians may share with the patient that other 
individuals who have provided similar responses are more likely to become triggered by 
high stress interpersonal situations and, in a therapy setting, may be more likely to leave 
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treatment when things feels particularly intense or the patients perceive conflict between 
self and therapist. This may provide space for a meaningful conversation about times the 
patient has experienced similar events, and lead to a collaborative discussion about ways 
that this might be handled differently in a treatment context.  For other patients, for 
whom a collaborative conversation may be less productive in this early session, the 
clinician may choose to emphasize the treatment frame with the patient who has provided 
splitting or lower level defense responses. Making a purposeful decision to more firmly 
discuss the cancellation or attendance policies, or to vocalize the process for reaching out 
if there are missed appointments, may help to solidify the parameters of therapy in a way 
that gives this patient a secure sense of limits and boundaries. It also gives the therapist 
ground for approaching subsequent limit testing or early termination signals in a direct 
and therapeutically relevant manner.  
Role and Responsibility of the Therapist  
In the earliest stages of therapy, therapists should be alert to indications that the 
patient may be reacting to the anxiety of the therapy experience by considering 
termination.  This is not to say that the therapist should assume all patients who do not 
take on therapy enthusiastically should be considered primitively defended, anxious, or 
enacting interpersonal patterns through this behavior.  Rather, clinical acumen, careful 
consideration of the circumstances of departure, and analysis of the clinical material and 
assessment tools employed up to the time of termination should be thoughtfully examined 
for evidence of primitive response, as opposed to rejection of therapy, or other common 
reasons for patient-driven termination.  Clinical attunement to primitive defense patterns 
can serve two positive functions: (a) allowing the clinician to make intervention decisions 
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that are helpful to this group of patients and (b) allowing the clinician to empathize with 
the patient who may elicit less warmth and sympathy based on these behaviors. Ways in 
which clinicians might use this information to minimize flight, including a strong focus 
on the clinical frame and collaborative discussion with the patient about assessment 
results, have already been mentioned.  
The ability to recognize the effects that primitive defense manifestations may 
have on the therapeutic relationship is equally important. The clinician who is attuned to 
the ways that defense can affect the interpersonal relationship between self and patient is 
in a better position to empathize with the patient’s behaviors that may present as 
challenging. Understanding the patient’s defensive patterns as a means to protect a fragile 
sense of self is a far more sympathetic position than interpreting defenses as simply 
“resistant” or “oppositional.” Kohut describes this therapeutic stance beautifully when he 
writes: 
Defense motivation in analysis will be understood in terms of activities 
undertaken to save at least that sector of his nuclear self, however small and 
precariously established it may be, that he has been able to construct and maintain 
despite serious insufficiencies in the development-enhancing matrix of the 
selfobjects of childhood. (Kohut, 1984, p. 115) 
When the “small and precariously established” part of self that may be anxiously 
activated by the therapy process is recognized, attended to, and made to feel more safe, 
therapy may become a more realistic option for the skittish patient. 
 Vaillant acknowledges the ways that the therapist may respond in a negatively 
countertransferential way to the primitively defended patient, stating: “Immature defenses 
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are contagious.” (1992, p. 66). The therapist may easily respond to primitive defense with 
a similarly defensive pattern, which may contribute to the “poor rapport” credited for 
many failed therapeutic relationships. Being confronted with splitting, especially when 
one is taking on the “bad object” projections of the patient, can be a deflating or 
discouraging experience for the clinician. When a therapist finds him or her self reacting 
to a patient with contempt, irritation, or frustration, it is useful to reflect upon the ways a 
patient’s behavior may elicit a counter-behavior or attitude that is relevant to the 
presenting problem or the patient’s pathology or suffering.   
We have to again and again analyze the splitting processes, which I now think is 
the most difficult part of the analytic procedure... It is of the greatest importance 
to observe every detail in the transference situation which throws light on the 
earliest difficulties. (Klein, 1986, p. 226) 
A benefit of early identification of primitive defense is that potentially negative 
countertransference reactions can be recognized and managed early on, and the clinician 
can focus on developing appropriate treatment plans. For the primitively defended 
patient, perhaps no sessions are more important than the first several, when basic 
assumptions about therapy and the therapeutic relationship are established.  
In a psychotherapy setting, to dismiss the patient’s split positive and negative 
affects as ‘just transference’ is to miss the point. The therapist must work to create 
an atmosphere that is conducive to letting the patient experience simultaneously 
negative and positive aspects of important relationships, including his or her 
relationship with the therapist. Unconditional positive regard, safety, and firmness 
are all necessary- all within the same session. (Vaillant, 1992, p. 72) 
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As Vaillant suggests, recognizing defense is not enough; the responsible therapist then 
relies on clinical acumen and case formulation to cultivate an environment that is safe 
and structured so that the therapy can begin to take place.  
Limitations 
The limitations of the present study include: 1) a small sample size; 2) the files 
used were all sourced from one mental health clinic, and therefore are limited to a 
population that is geographically, and to a degree, demographically, homogenous; 3) all 
of the tests and summaries were recorded by training therapists; and 4) there were 
challenges in operationalizing the terms “premature termination” and “not premature 
termination” and assigning patients into these groups. 
The most notable limitation is the sample size used for this study. A sample size 
of 35 is small, particularly when running more complex analyses, including logistic 
regression. During exploratory research, 54 patients were identified as potential subjects 
for this study because their files contained Rorschach protocols. However, many of these 
patients were excluded due to the fact that some of the Rorschach protocols were 
inadequately archived (for example, did not include patient’s verbatim responses to the 
card prompts) or the final summaries were not complete.  
This research is considered an initial exploratory study, as it is the first to examine 
the relationship between the Lerner Defense Scales and premature termination. For this 
reason, effect size and power analyses were not known. The fact that this small data set 
still allowed for positive predictive findings is exciting, and it is expected that replicating 
this study with a larger sample population may produce more compelling evidence for a 
 81 
 
relationship between primitive defense and premature termination. As previously 
discussed, a sample size of at least 100 would be appropriate for a follow-up study. 
Another limitation to this study is that the findings represent a generally 
homogenous population. Though full demographic information was not available, the 
subjects were almost all Caucasian adults from the greater Pittsburgh area. Studies that 
aim to replicate these findings should attempt to capture a study population that is more 
representative of the general population seeking psychotherapy.  
Furthermore, all of the patient files used for this study were drawn from one 
training clinic. Rorschach tests were administered and documented by therapists in 
training; the same therapists typically wrote the final summaries. While this did not affect 
the scoring of the Lerner Defense Scales (which were scored separately for this project 
based on the written responses to the Rorschach test), there may have been problems with 
the transcription of patient responses or the detail captured by the clinicians. In other 
words, there is no way to verify the accuracy of the verbatim responses to the Rorschach 
test. Similarly, clinicians had different approaches to writing the final summaries and 
some files had more detailed summaries than others. Future studies may benefit from 
using videotaped administrations of the Rorschach test in order to ensure accuracy in 
capturing patients’ responses. Other ways of ensuring good data may be to use protocols 
from known administrators who have been trained in the same administration practices, 
and using structured final summary templates that ask for particular information.  
Finally, the methods for defining premature termination and then dividing patients 
into groups were developed during the course of this study. Other studies have used a 
variety of criteria for determining “premature termination” and there is not “standard 
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practice” in the existing research. Clinician judgment has been a commonly used qualifier 
and was the proposed method for this project. However, the information available in final 
summaries was inadequate to allow this factor to be the sole determinant.  As described 
in the methods chapter, several factors, including number of sessions, clinician judgment, 
patient ambiguity and external events were all considered, scored, and summed to create 
a total score related to termination factors. Subjects were assigned into groups based on 
their total scores. Although this method worked well for this study, and the percentages 
of individuals who terminated prematurely were commensurate with percentages reported 
in other studies, future studies may use different approaches to determining termination 
status and evaluate whether the findings presented here are replicated.  
Areas of suggested further inquiry 
 As the first study to explore how the Lerner Defense Scales may be used in 
predicting premature termination, this research provides a foundation for future research. 
Several particular areas of inquiry are suggested by these results. 
Attempts to replicate the findings of this study 
Because of the small sample size, replication of this study with a larger population 
is an important future direction. Justification for this larger subject base has been 
discussed earlier in the chapter, but several points are worth restating. 1) A larger sample 
size will provide a more reliable data set from which to retest the findings presented here. 
2) A larger sample size is more amenable to logistic regression analysis. Working with 
data from 100 or more subjects would clarify the utility of Lerner Defense Scale scores 
for predict termination status and may provide more information about predictive value 
for single-item measures (each defense) as well. 3) A larger sample size would allow for 
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greater attention to demographic and other categorical factors that may influence the 
outcomes. It would be interesting, for example, to see whether individuals from various 
socioeconomic groups or geographic regions of the country have similar or disparate 
patterns of defense use and termination. 
Studying effects of tailored interventions on termination status 
 If research on larger populations with more statistical power suggests that 
splitting or lower level defense use is a predictive variable for premature termination, 
exploring the efficacy of intervention strategies is appropriate. A study might look at 
individuals who are identified as using splitting during the intake process who receive 
one of two descriptions of treatment contract after the initial assessment is complete. One 
group would receive a “business as usual” discussion of treatment frame, including 
policies and procedures associated with the treatment setting. Another group would have 
a more intensive discussion about treatment considerations, including a detailed 
description of attempts to connect is there is a missed appointment, or perhaps 
contracting for a set number of appointments as a trial period. Termination patterns 
between groups may indicate whether tailored consent and treatment contacts have an 
effect on treatment adherence. 
 Assuming that there would be value in this type of intervention, a more ethically 
minded design might implement these increased intervention strategies to an entire 
sample population, evaluate the dropout rates for this group, and compare these rates to 
those described in the current literature. 
Exploring other assessment measures that identify primitive defense use 
 84 
 
The Lerner Defense Scales were specifically designed to identify primitive 
defense use in borderline patients, and rely on tenants of psychoanalytic theory and 
assessment practices. The Rorschach Inkblot Test is a valuable but time consuming 
instrument, and for clinicians who do not have training with this test other means of 
gathering information through tests might be considered. There are several cards in the 
Rorschach set that are more likely to elicit human percepts than other cards (i.e. Cards III, 
IV and VI). Potential studies may explore the utility of a “brief” Rorschach test, 
specifically designed to elicit responses that incorporate human figures and listening for 
evidence of primitive defense language in each patient’s description. The Thematic 
Apperception Test is another projective test that almost exclusively portrays human 
figures on the stimulus cards. Exploring whether the Lerner Defense Scale scoring 
criteria might apply to other tests that generate descriptions of human activity is a 
noteworthy area of inquiry.  
Updating the Lerner Defense Scales 
 The Lerner Defense Scales are not commonly used in contemporary assessment 
practices. They are, however, respected by those who are familiar with the scales and as 
this study’s findings suggest, have utility in clinical practice. Studies that more rigorously 
examine the validity and reliability of these scales in current assessment practices are 
recommended. In this project, for example, the Idealization and Devaluation scales were 
scored far more frequently than the “lower level primitive defense” scales; furthermore, 
they used a 1-5 point scoring system, which meant that they captured a greater range of 
potential defensive expression than the splitting scale, for which an individual either 
scored or did not. Evaluating whether the five scales all appear to measure the same 
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construct, and whether the scoring method could be homogenized between scales are 
both projects that may render the Lerner Defense Scales more user friendly and 
diagnostically effective in a contemporary clinical environment.  
Conclusions 
The relationship between “lower level primitive defenses” (splitting, denial, and 
projective identification) and premature termination from therapy is a promising finding.  
Especially given the small sample size for this study, significance between these 
variables (and near-significance between total defense scores and premature termination) 
suggests that research on a larger scale in an important next step. Furthermore, the 
finding that splitting has significance as a descriptive difference between termination 
groups is encouraging for further exploration of the predictive power of splitting.  As 
discussed in the literature review, splitting and other primitive defense mechanisms have 
an important place, historically, in case formulation and dynamic diagnostic 
considerations. The value of identifying tendencies to split early in therapy has 
tremendous implications for individualizing and monitoring the therapeutic process in 
order to maximize the benefits for the patient and to encourage appropriate interventions 
by the therapist.  
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Appendix A: Criteria to score the Lerner Defense Scales 
From Rorschach Assessment of Defense: 2. Recent Measures. In Lerner, P. 
(1998). Psychoanalytic Perspectives on the Rorschach. New Jersey: The Analytic Press. 
Splitting 
Score splitting in the following cases. 
(A) In a sequence of responses, a human percept described in terms of a specific, 
nonambivalent, nonambiguous affective dimension is immediately followed by 
another human response in which the affective description is opposite that used to 
describe the preceding responses: for example, “looks like an ugly criminal with 
a gun” immediately followed by “couples sitting together cheek to cheek.” 
(B) In the description of one total human figure a clear distinction of parts is made, so 
that one part of the figure is seen as opposite another part: for example, “A giant. 
His lower part here conveys danger, but his top half looks benign.” 
(C) Included in one response are two clearly distinguished figures, and these figures 
are described in opposite ways: for example, “Two figures, a man and a woman. 
He is mean and shouting at her. Being rather angelic, she’s standing there and 
taking it.” 
(D) An implicitly idealized figure is tarnished by the addition of one or more features: 
for example, “a headless angel.” 
Devaluation 
In addition to identifying the defense, devaluation is also rated on a five-point continuum. 
Underlying the continuum are three dimensions. The first dimension involves the degree 
to which the humanness of the figure is retained. For examples, such percepts as waiters 
 95 
 
or clowns are accorded a higher score than are more distorted forms, such as monsters 
and mythological objects. A temporal-spatial consideration determines the second 
dimension. Contemporary human percepts set in a current and close locale are scored 
higher than are those percepts from either the past or future and set in a distant setting. 
The final dimension involves the severity of depreciation as conveyed in the affective 
description. Figures described in more primitive, blatant, socially unacceptable ways are 
scored lower than are those that are described in negatively tinged but more civilized and 
socially acceptable ways. To denote devaluation, use the symbol DV. Add to this score 
the number below that corresponds to the appropriate level of devaluation. For example, 
“an angry man” is scored DV1. 
(1) The humanness dimension is retained, there is no distancing of the figure in time 
or space, and the figure is described in negatively tinged but socially acceptable 
terms: for example, “two people fighting”; “a girl in a funny costume.” 
(2) The humanness dimension is retained, there may or may not be distancing of the 
figure in time or space, and the figure is described in blatantly negative and 
socially unacceptable negative terms. This score would also include human 
figures with parts missing: for example, “a diseased African child”; “a woman 
defecating”; “a sinister-looking male figure”; “a disjointed figure with the head 
missing.” 
(3) The humanness dimension is retained but involved in the percept is a distortion of 
the human form; there may or may not be distancing of the figure in time or 
space; and if the figure is described negatively, it is in socially acceptable terms. 
This rating includes such figures as clowns, elves, savages, witches, devils, and 
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figures of the occult: for example, “sad looking clowns”; “cannibal standing over 
a pot”; “the bad witch.” 
(4) The humanness dimension is retained, but implied in the percept is a distortion of 
the human form. There may or may not be distancing of the figure in time or 
space, and the figure is described in blatantly negative and socially unacceptable 
terms. This rating involves the same types of figures as in (3); however, the 
negative description is more severe: for example, “a couple of evil witches”; “two 
people from Mars who look very scary”; “a sinister Ku Klux Klansman.” 
(5) The humanness dimension is lost, there may or may not be distancing of the 
distorted form in time or space, and the figure is described in either neutral or 
negative terms. This rating includes puppets, mannequins, robots, creatures with 
some human characteristics, part-human-part-animal responses, and human 
responses with one or more animal features: for example, “Mannequins with 
dresses but missing a head”; “two people but half-male and half-animal from 
outer space”; “a woman with breasts, high-heeled shoes, and a bird’s beak for a 
mouth.” 
 
Idealization 
As in the case of devaluation, idealization is also rated on a five-point continuum. 
Underlying the continuum are the same three dimensions. For scoring, denote 
idealization with the letter I. Add to this score the number below that corresponds with 
the appropriate level of idealization. Thus, “a person with a big smile” is scored I1. 
 97 
 
(1) The humanness dimension is retained, there is no distancing of the figure in time 
or space, and the figure is described in a positive but not excessively flattering 
way: for example, “two nice people looking over a fence”; “a person with a happy 
smile.” 
(2) The humanness dimension is retained, there may or may not be distancing of the 
figure in time or space, and the figure is described in blatantly and excessively 
positive terms: for example, “two handsome, muscular Russians doing that 
famous dance”; “What an angelic figure; long hair, a flowing gown, and a look of 
complete serenity.” 
(3) The humanness dimension is retained, but implied in the percept is a distortion of 
human form. There may or may not be distancing of the figure in time or space, 
and if the figure is described positively, it is in moderate terms. This rating 
includes such objects of fame, adoration, or strength as civic leaders, officials, and 
famous people: for example, “Charles de Gaulle”; “an astronaut, one of those 
fellows who landed on the moon.” 
(4) The humanness dimension is retained, but implied in the percept is a distortion of 
human form. There may or may not be distancing of the figure in time or space, 
and the figure is described in blatantly and excessively positive terms. This rating 
includes the same types of figures as in (3); however, the positive description in 
more excessive: for example, “a warrior; not just any warrior but the tallest, 
strongest, and bravest”; “Attila the Hun, but with the largest genitals I have ever 
seen.” 
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(5) The humanness dimension is lost, but implied in the distortion is an enhancement 
of identity. There may or may not be distancing of the distorted form in time or 
space, and the figure is described in either neutral or positive terms. This rating 
includes statues of famous figures, giants, supermen or superwomen, space 
figures with supernatural powers, angels, and idols. Also included are half-
humans in which the nonhuman aspect nonetheless adds to the figure’s 
appearance or power: for example, “a bust of Queen Victoria”; “powerful beings 
from another planet, ruling over these softer creatures. 
 
Projective Identification 
Score projective identification in the following cases. 
(A) Confabulatory responses involving human figures in which the form level is Fw- 
or F- and the percept is overly embellished with associative elaboration to the 
point that real properties of the blot are disregarded and replaced by fantasies and 
affects. More typically, the associative elaboration involves material with 
aggressive or sexual meaning, as in the following example: “A huge man coming 
to get me. I can see his huge teeth. He’s staring straight at me. His hands are up 
as if he will strike me.” 
(B) Those human or detail responses in which the location is Dr, the determinant is 
Fc, and the figure is described as either aggressive or having been aggressed 
against: for example, “an ugly face” (with forehead and features seen in reference 
to the inner portion of Card IV); “an injured man” (Card VI upper, center area). 
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Denial 
Denial in this system refers to a broad group of defenses arranged on a continuum based 
on the degree of reality distortion involved in the response. Higher-level forms of denial 
involve a minimum of reality distortion, whereas middle- and lower-level manifestations 
of denial include increasingly greater degrees of reality distortion. To score denial, use 
the symbol DN. Add to this score the number below that corresponds to the level of 
denial. Thus, the response “I know they are not fighting” would be scored DN1. 
(1) Higher-level denial: Denial at this level consists of several subsidiary defenses 
manifested in responses in which the form level is the percept is F+, Fo or Fw+. 
(a) Negation: Negation involves disavowal of the impulse. The disavowal may be 
manifested in two ways. In one, the disavowal is smoothly blended into the 
response itself, whereas in the other the response, or aspects of the response, 
are couched in negative terms: for example, “virgin”; “angel”; “these figures 
are not angry.” 
(b) Intellectualization: In this process, the response is stripped of its drive and 
affective charge by its being presented in an overly technical, scientific, 
literate, or intellectual way: for example, “two homo sapiens”; “two 
Kafkaesque figures.” 
(c) Minimization: With minimization, drive-laden material is included in the 
response, but in a reduced and nonthreatening way. This includes changing a 
human figure into a caricature or cartoon figure: for example, “a shadow cast 
by an evil person”; “a child with his hand clenched in a fist”; “a funny man, 
more like a caricature.” 
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(d) Repudiation: With repudiation, a response is retracted or the individual denies 
having even given the response. 
(2) Middle-level denial: Denial at this level involves responses in which the form 
level is F+, Fo, or Fw+, and involved in the response is a basic contradiction. The 
contradiction may be on affective, logical, or reality grounds: for example, “a 
sexy Santa Claus”; “two nuns fighting”; “a man reading while asleep.” 
(3) Lower-level denial: At this level, reality adherence is abrogated, but in a 
particular way. Specifically, an acceptable response is rendered unacceptable 
either by adding something that is not there or by failing to take into account an 
aspect of the blot that is clearly to be seen. This corresponds to Mayman’s (1970) 
form spoil (Fs) response. In addition, this level also includes responses in which 
incompatible descriptions are given to the percept: for example, “two people but 
their top half is the female and bottom half male; each has breasts and a penis”; “a 
person, but instead of a moth there is a bird’s beak”; “a person sitting on its huge 
tail.” 
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Appendix B: Lerner Defense Scale Score Scatterplots 
 
Table B1. Splitting 
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Table B2. Devaluation 
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Table B3. Idealization 
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Table B4. Denial 
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Table B5. Projective Identification 
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